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Sustainable Development and Market Liberalism's Shotgun
Wedding: Emissions Trading Under the Kyoto Protocol
DAVID M. DRIESEN*

This Article analyzes the internationalemissions tradingregime at the heartof the
world's effort to address global warming as a means of exploring broader
internationalgovernance issues. The trading regime seeks to marry two models of
globalgovernance,market liberalism,which embraces markets as the modelofglobal
governance, and sustainable development, which seeks to change development
patternsto protectfuture generations.
This Article explores a previously unacknowledged tension between market
liberalism's goal of maximizing short-term cost effectiveness and sustainable
development's goal of catalyzing technological change for the benefit of future
generations.This Articlepresents new data and theory unsettling the traditionalview
that market mechanisms encourage innovations vital to sustainabledevelopment.
Market actors fail to take positive spillovers-for example, benefits accruing to
competitors and thence to future generations-intoaccount in making technological
choices. Because of thisfailureto take long-term economic development into account,
the internationaltrading markets have contributedfar less to sustainable energy
development than more targetedprograms.
Considerationof these spilloversyields fresh insights. Market liberalism'sideal of
comprehensive evaluation of costs and benefits conflicts with its preferenceforfree
markets. Conversely, sustainable development advocates' tendency to rely on
collective decision making to make difficult technological choices may prove
unrealistic. This Article unsettles prevailing notions of governance and seeks to
stimulatea richer,more subtle discourse about the roles ofgovernmentandmarkets in
addressingglobalproblems.
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INTRODUCTION

An entrepreneur in India wishes to implement a project reducing emissions of
greenhouse gases, which trap heat and thereby contribute to global warming.' She
plans to sell credits representing her project's emission reductions to owners of coalfired power plants in Germany, who face emission reduction obligations under the
Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
("Kyoto Protocol" or "Kyoto"). 2 Under the Kyoto Protocol's emission trading
programs, these plant owners can purchase credits reflecting the emission reductions
generated by foreign environmental projects in lieu of making all of the required
greenhouse gas reductions at their own facilities. 3 So, if our entrepreneur develops a
suitable project, a European company may pay her for the credits her emission
reduction project generates, enabling her to make a profit.
Let us assume that she faces a choice between two emission reduction projects. One
project involves using an end-of-the-pipe technology to control HFC 23, a potent
greenhouse gas. 4 The other involves installing a new type of solar energy technology, a

1. See ANDREw E. DESSLER & EDWARD A. PARSON, THE SCIENCE AND POLITICS OF
GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE: A GUIDE TO THE DEBATE 8 (2006) (explaining that greenhouse gases
warm the earth by absorbing infrared radiation that would otherwise escape into space).
2. See Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,
openedfor signature Dec. 10, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22 [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol]. See generally
MICHAEL GRUBB, CHRISTIAAN VROLIJK & DUNCAN BRACK, KYOTO PROTOCOL: A GUIDE AND
ASSESSMENT (1999); FARHANA YAMIN & JOANNA DEPLEDGE, THE INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE
CHANGE REGIME: A GUIDE TO RULES, INSTITUTIONS, AND PROCEDURES (2004).
3. See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 2, art. 12; Kevin A. Baumert, Note, Participationof
DevelopingCountriesin the InternationalClimate ChangeRegime: Lessonsfor the Future,38
GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REv. 365,383 (2006) (explaining that the Clean Development Mechanism
described in article 2 of the Kyoto Protocol allows "companies from industrialized countries to.
• . receive emission reduction credits from projects based in developing countries."). See
generallyDavid M. Driesen, FreeLunch or Cheap Fix?: The Emissions TradingIdea and the
Climate Change Convention,26 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 1,27-35 (1998) (analyzing the key
language in the Kyoto Protocol authorizing trading). In all likelihood, the producer can only
substitute credits for some of her reductions, because the Kyoto Protocol requires that trading
function as a supplement to domestic reductions. See Kyoto Protocol, supranote 2, arts. 6(l)(d),
12(3)(b), 17. For any particular producer, the extent of permissible reliance on foreign credits
will depend upon domestic trading rules implementing the Kyoto Protocol's "supplementarity"
requirement. See Sharon Long & Giedre Kaminskaite-Salters, The EU ETS-Latest
Developments andthe Way Forward,1 CARBON & CLIMATE L. REv. 64,65 (2007) (pointing out
that EU member states are required to set limits on the use of credits from the CDM to conform
to the Kyoto Protocol's "supplementarity" requirement).
4. See generally PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPER LTD., CDM PROJECT DESIGN DOCUMENT:
PROJECT FOR GHG EMISSION REDUCTION BY THERMAL OXIDATION OF HFC 23 AT HCFC 22
PLANT OF GUJARAT FLUOROCHEMICALS LIMITED (GFL), available at http://cdm.unfccc.int/
UserManagement/FileStorage/FS_59491890 [hereinafter HFC PDD] (describing installation and
operation of a thermal oxidation system to control HFC 23 emissions).
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form of renewable energy which avoids emissions of carbon dioxide, the most
ubiquitous greenhouse gas.5 In this situation, our entrepreneur would likely choose the
option that produces the cheapest emission reductions. 6 Since HFC 23 control usually
costs less than solar power installation, she would likely choose the end-of-the-pipe
option.7 Is this the best choice for society?

5. See National Energy Conservation Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 15851 (2006) (stating that
renewable energy includes "solar... resources."); U.S. EPA, STATE AND LOCAL CLIMATE
CHANGE PROGRAM, CLIMATE CHANGE TECHNOLOGIES: SOLAR ENERGY 1 (2000), available at

http://yosemite.epa.gov/oar/globalwarming.nsf/uniquekeylookup/shsu5bvr3a/$fle/solarenergy.
pdf (stating that solar energy technologies emit no greenhouse gases during operation);
CLIMATE CHANGE 1995: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF CLIMATE CHANGE 241 (James P.
Bruce, H. Lee & E.F. Haites eds., 1996) (noting that renewable energy sources emit little carbon
and that switching to them reduces emissions); Inho Choi, Global Climate Change and the Use
of Economic Approaches: The Ideal Design Features of Domestic Greenhouse Gas Emissions
Trading with an Analysis of the European Union's C0 2 Emissions Trading Directive and the
Climate Stewardship Act, 45 NAT. RESOURCES J. 865, 936 (2005) (explaining that renewable
energy reduces emissions by avoiding fossil fuel combustion); Kirsten H. Engel, The Dormant
Commerce Clause Threat to Market-Based Environmental Regulation: The Case ofElectricity
Deregulation, 26 ECOLOGY L.Q. 243,270 n.73 (1999) (stating that renewable energy produces
no carbon emissions). See generally Simone Espey, Renewable Portfolio Standard."A Means for
Trade With Electricity from Renewable Energy Sources?, 29 ENERGY POL'Y 557, 558 (2001)
(explaining that renewable resources are "inexhaustible").
6. See Jolene Lin Shuwen, Assessing The Dragon 's Choice: The Use of Market-Based
Instruments in Chinese Environmental Policy, 16 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 617, 633 (2004)
(emissions trading creates incentives for firms to minimize the aggregate costs of producing a
given level of environmental quality); Thomas K. Ruppert, Water Quality Trading And
Agricultural Nonpoint Source Pollution: An Analysis Of The Effectiveness And Fairness Of
EPA's Policy On Water Quality Trading, 15 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 1,4-5 (2004) (describing trading
as encouraging parties with the least cost abatement options to reduce their pollutant loadings).
These technological options involve choosing between reductions of two different greenhouse
gases. The climate change regime employs scientific assessment of different greenhouse gases'
relative contributions to global warming to create trading ratios, measuring the value of all
relevant emission reductions in carbon dioxide equivalents. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANELON
CLIMATE CHANGE, WORKING GROUP I, IPCC THIRD ASSESSMENT REPORT: THE SCIENTIFIC
BASIS, ch. 6.12.2 (2001), available at http://www.grida.no/climate/ipcc-tar/wgl/248.htm;
Richard B. Stewart & Jonathan B. Wiener, The Comprehensive Approach to Global Climate
Policy: Issues of Design and Practicability, 9 ARIz. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 83, 86 (1992). See
generally James Salzman & J.B. Ruhl, Currencies and the Commodification ofEnvironmental
Law, 53 STAN. L. REV. 607 (2000) (explaining that choosing a common currency for
environmental benefits trades can prove problematic). For a potent greenhouse gas like HFC 23,
a relatively small amount of reduction can generate a "carbon benefit" (i.e., reduced warming)
equal to a relatively large carbon dioxide reduction. For purposes of understanding the text's
hypothetical problem, the reader should assume that both technological options deliver the same
amount of carbon dioxide equivalents. Also, this Article uses the term "carbon" in isolation to
refer to carbon dioxide equivalents.
7. See KARAN CAPOOR & PHILIPPE AMBROSI, STATE AND TRENDS OF THE CARBON MARKET

2006 i (2006), available at http://carbonfinance.org/docs/StateoftheCarbonMarket2006.pdf
(characterizing HFC projects as the "lowest-cost options" and therefore becoming the "first asset
classes to be systematically tapped globally."); Xingshu Zhao & Axel Michaelowa, CDM
Potential for Rural Transition in China Case Study: Options in Yinzhou District, Zhejiang
Province, 34 ENERGY POL'Y 1867, 1876 (2006) (finding the initial cost of solar installation high,
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Two overarching concepts tend to shape observers' answers to this question. One
concept, market liberalism, tends to favor free global markets and the use of economic
principles developed to describe ideal markets. 8 Another concept, sustainable
development, emphasizes adequately
9 meeting the current generation's basic needs
while protecting future generations.
If we view emissions trading as a mechanism that happily marries sustainable
development and market liberalism, we would assume that society should prefer HFC
23 control, the least costly option. This happy marriage view suggests that selection of
a cost-effective solution is always a good outcome that provides for sustainable
development and allows the free market to work its magic.' 0
The HFC 23 example, however, raises questions about whether cost effectiveness
and sustainable development align. HFC 23 comes from production of HCFC 22, an
ozone-depleting substance used in refrigeration." The international community,
including India, has agreed to phase out HCFC 22 under the Montreal Protocol on
Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer.' 2 This HFC project promises a perfectly
good greenhouse gas emission reduction, which would help ameliorate future climate
change. But it provides a technological benefit that will only help the current
generation, not future generations. 3 This facility should shut down anyway at some
point and HFC 23 control would then lose all value to society. 14 If our entrepreneur
even though over the long term it is cost competitive).
8. See Douglas A. Kysar, SustainableDevelopment andPrivate Global Governance, 83
TEX. L. REV. 2109,2116 (2005).
9. See World Comm'n on Env't & Dev., Our Common Future: Report of the World
Commission on Environment & Development, at 54, U.N. Doc A/42/427 (Aug. 4, 1987)
[hereinafter BRUNDTLAND REPORT] (defining sustainable development as development meeting
the current generation's needs without compromising future generations' ability to meet their
own needs).
10. See Baumert, supra note 3, at 384 (explaining that the CDM encourages private sector

project development to seek out the least cost reductions); cf David M. Driesen, Markets Are
Not Magic,ENVTL. F., Nov.-Dec. 2003, at 19 (discussing the "tendency to view the free market
as a magical solution to environmental problems").
II. See HFC PDD, supranote 4, at 8.
12. Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, S.
Treaty Doc. No. 100-10, 1522 U.N.T.S. 3,26 I.L.M. 1550; see also MENOJ MEHROTA, POSSIBLE
ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO ASSESSINGTHE BASELINE SCENARIO FORDESTRUCTIONOF HFC 23
INTHE HCFC 22 INDUSTRY 2 (noting that India has ratified the Montreal Protocol with its
London and Beijing Amendments and has passed implementing regulations addressing HCFC
22). But see EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE MULTILATERAL FUND FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF
THE MONTREAL PROTOCOL, COUNTRY PROGRAM UPDATE: INDIA 3 (2006), available at
http://www.multilateralfund.org/files/49/4937.pdf (stating that HCFC 22 production has gone up
in India even while India has phased out other ozone depleters).
13. See Gerard Winn, UN. Kyoto ChiefJudges Climate Change Options, REUTERS, May
30,2006, http://www.sea-user.org/news-detail.php?news id= 1607 (quoting a UN official who
criticized the HFC 23 reduction project and stated that "the environmental benefits must be clear
for future generations.").
14. See Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Technology and Economic
Assessment Panel, Special Report: Safeguarding the Ozone Layer and the Global Climate
System: Issues Related to Hydroflurocarbonsand Perfluorocarbons,at 394-396, U.N.Doc.
FCCC/SBSTA/2005/L.8 (May 26, 2005), available at http://arch.rivm.nl/env/int/ipcc/

pages media/SROC-final/SpecialReportSROC.html

(explaining that HFC-23 emission
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chooses this project based on its long-term cost effectiveness, she may not have chosen
an option that contributes much to long-term efforts to protect future generations.
A choice of solar technology might better protect future generations. Solar
technology also reduces greenhouse gas emissions, but this reduction could continue
indefinitely' 5 (unlike the reduction in HFC 23, which only provides a real additional
benefit during the HFC 22 plant's short remaining life). Moreover, deployment of an
experimental solar option might contribute to solving the most important long-term
technological problem at the heart of climate change: how to run advanced industrial
economies without ever increasing fossil fuel use.' 6 This benefit might accrue because
burning fossil fuels creates carbon dioxide, the most important greenhouse gas
contributing to global warming. 17 Also, fossil fuels are non-renewable resources,
meaning that they will eventually run out.' 8 If this solar experiment leads to
technological developments significantly reducing our reliance on fossil fuels, it may
help improve the welfare of the future generations that will need alternatives to finite
fossil fuel resources. Thus, the cost-effective choice that the market favors may not
coincide with the choice that sustainable development considerations favor.
This Article examines the question of whether emissions trading successfully
marries market liberalism and sustainable development. Douglas A. Kysar has
correctly identified the question of market liberalism's compatibility with sustainable
development as a key question for global environmental governance.' 9 Indeed,
responses to this question color perceptions of most environmental and economic
formation depends upon the HCFC-22 manufacture process, which implies that no reductions
can occur once the facilities are shut); Yvonne Hofman, David de Jager & Sina Wartmann,
Climate Change Scientific Assessment and Policy Analysis: Instrumentation of HFC-23

EmissionReductionfrom the ProductionofHCFC-22,EcoFYs
http://www.mnp.nI/bibliotheek/rapporten/500102006.pdf

REPORT,

at7 (2006), availableat

(same). Cf OTHMAR

SCHWANK,

CONCERNS ABOUT CDM PROJECTS BASED ON DECOMPOSITION OF HFC-23 EMISSIONS FROM

HFC-23 EMISSIONS FROM 22 HCFC PRODUCTION SITES 4 (2004), available at
http://cdm.unfccc.int/public-inputs/inputam0001/CommentAMOOO1_Schwank_081004.pdf
(expressing a concern that approval of CDM credits for emissions associated with HCFC 22
production may create an incentive to delay phasing out this ozone depleting chemical). If one
assumes that the carbon credits will create sufficient incentives to keep the HCFC 22 plant open,
then the decision to use this option creates a continuing carbon benefit, but creates an ozone
depletion cost. Either way, the net societal value of the project may be less than that associated
with a project that does not involve an ozone depleting production process.
15. See Winn, supra note 13 (recognizing renewable energy as creating "a stable structure"
for not emitting C0 2).
16. See RICHARD A. POSNER, CATASTROPHE: RISK AND RESPONSE 15 (2004) (explaining that

breakthroughs in solar technology could help enable a substitution of solar energy for fossil
fuels at reasonable cost).
17. See id. (describing global warming as largely a product of fossil fuel combustion);
Richard B. Stewart, Economic Incentives for EnvironmentalProtection: Opportunitiesand
Obstacles, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, THE ECONOMY, AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT

228

(Richard L. Revesz, Philippe Sands & Richard B. Stewart eds., 2000) (characterizing carbon

dioxide as "the most important" greenhouse gas).
18. Cf POSNER, supra note 16, at 59 (recognizing that fossil fuel resources are finite, but
arguing that they may not be finite relative to human demand because prices will rise when they

become scarce).
19. See Kysar, supra note 8, at 2114-18 (discussing the rise of market liberalism and
international interest in sustainable development).
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issues. 20 Therefore, it is not surprising that the relationship between free market and
sustainable development ideals has commanded scholars' attention. 21
Emissions trading helps shape perceptions of this relationship. Most neoliberals
(market liberalism advocates) support regulatory reforms that employ market concepts
to shape environmental regulations, 22 rather than condemn government regulation
altogether. 23 These reforms include wider use of cost-benefit analysis (CBA) to
determine regulatory goals and of emissions trading to meet these goals.24 The
international embrace of emissions trading under the Kyoto Protocol suggests that
emissions trading may qualify as the most widely accepted neoliberal environmental
reform.25 Hence, if a happy marriage exists anywhere, it should exist in the realm of
emissions trading under the Kyoto Protocol.
This Article claims that markets neglect positive "spillovers" associated with
technological choices, that is, benefits that do not lead to increased payments to the
firm making the choice, which are crucial to sustainable development. If introduction
of a new solar technology inspires technological advances by competitors, for
example, this creates a positive spillover. This Article aims to show that positive
spillovers are vital to addressing global climate change and to shine new light on our
understanding of market liberalism, sustainable development, and environmental law.
Recognition of spillover's positive values draws the congruity of market liberalism and
sustainable development into question, suggesting an unhappy marriage between the
two concepts.
Part I of this Article provides needed background by introducing the concepts of
market liberalism and sustainable development, explaining emissions trading, and
providing a primer on the climate change regime. It emphasizes emissions trading's
role in seeking to cement a union between sustainable development and market
liberalism ideals. Part II presents data on technological choices under the Kyoto

20. Cf Barbara Ann White, Economic Efficiency and the Parameters of Fairness: A
Marriageof Marketplace Moralsand the Ethic of Care, 15 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1, 2
(2005) ("The great divide among scholars.., is between those who advocate for using theories
of welfare-maximization derived from the study of market forces and those who urge that
fairness ...should predominate....").

21. See, e.g., WILLFRED BECKERMAN, A POVERTY OF REASON: SUSTAINABLEDEVELOPMENT
AND ECONOMIC GRowTH xii (2003) (an economist arguing that the sustainable development ideal
is not ethically superior to the "economist's goal of maximizing the sum of human welfare over
future generations"); HERMAN E. DALY, BEYOND GROWTH: THE ECONOMICS OF SUSTAINABILITY
(1996); GEOFFREY HEAL, VALUING THE FUTURE: ECONOMIC THEORY AND SUSTAINABILITY

(1998); Kysar, supra note 8, at 2118-47 (describing tensions between market liberalism and
sustainable development).
22. See Thomas 0. McGarity, The Expanded Debate over the Future of the Regulatory
State, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 1463, 1492 (1996).
23. See Kysar, supranote 8, at 2120 (noting that neoclassical economics does support some

regulation).
24 See, e.g., Robert W. Hahn & Robert E. Litan, CountingRegulatory Benefits and Costs:
Lessonsfor the US andEurope, 8 J. INT'L ECON. L. 473,481 (2005) (illustrating CBA approach
to regulation); McGarity, supra note 22, at 1491-97 (explaining that "free marketeers" favor

CBA and market-based mechanisms).
25. The term neoliberal describes a world view embracing broad reliance on global markets
and supporting economic concepts (i.e., the view embracing market liberalism). See Kysar,
supra note 8, at 2116.
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Protocol, like the choices our entrepreneur faces. The data discussed in Part II raises
questions about whether global emissions trading spurs technological innovation that
aids sustainable development. Part III uses the concept of positive spillovers to explore
this data's implications for environmental law and for the relationship between
sustainable development and market liberalism.
I. EMISSIONS TRADING UNDER THE KYOTO PROTOCOL: A PRIMER
A. Market Liberalism and SustainableDevelopment

Market liberalism embraces free markets and a set of economic concepts that
provides ideological support for neoliberal reforms. 26 The economic concepts
generally stem from efforts to describe, not justify, markets. But many of those
employing these concepts, especially in the law and economics movement, use them to
justify market-based solutions to problems.27 In general, economists tend to evaluate
all policies and decisions in terms of efficiency. Leading law and economics scholars,
most prominently, Richard Posner, 28
have argued that efficiency constitutes an
important goal for government policy.
While true devotees of free markets may prefer no regulation at all, most of those
employing economic concepts to justify markets recognize the need for some
regulation. 29 Economists generally presume that markets are efficient only when they
generate no "externalities," that is, costs or benefits not reflected in prices. 30 They
characterize the harms pollution causes as "negative externalities," that is, costs not
reflected in market prices. 3 1They state that regulation and pollution taxes "internalize"
costs associated with environmental harms by raising the market price of goods and
services to reflect their true environmental costs. 32 For example, economists regard
regulation and pollution taxes that raise electricity
prices to reflect the environmental
33
cost of electricity production as efficient.
This focus on efficiency tends to produce recommendations for two sets of
regulatory reforms. First, economists and their supporters tend to favor CBA's use in

26. See id. at 2116 (identifying market liberalism with a "neoliberal political philosophy"
and "cultural exaltation of the market").
27. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 16, at 201 (claiming that economics is both normative and
positive).
28. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE (1983); Louis Kaplow &
Steven Shavell, Fairnessv. Welfare, 114 HARv. L. REv. 961,968 (2001).
29. See McGarity, supra note 22, at 1484-1513 (contrasting "radical anti-interventionists"
opposing nearly all government regulation with other neoliberal groups that support reformed
regulation).
30. See David M. Driesen, The Societal Cost of Environmental Regulation: Beyond
Administrative Cost-Benefit Analysis, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 545, 552-53(1997).
31. See id.at 553 (discussing economists' characterization of harms from pollution as a cost
external to the market).
32. See id. (explaining that economists support regulating and/or taxing pollution to
internalize pollution's cost).
33. See id.at 577-78 (explaining the concept of an optimal, i.e., efficient, level of pollution
as that where the marginal benefits of control equal the marginal costs).

INDIANA LA W JOURNAL

[Vol. 83:21

establishing environmental regulation's goals.34 Such an approach requires policy
makers to attempt to quantify environmental policies' costs and benefits before
implementation.3 5 The costs of environmental policies come from expenditures to
make technological improvements, like those our entrepreneur contemplated.36 The
benefits include prevention of human deaths and illness and preservation of
ecosystems.37 Economists define efficient regulations as those equating costs and
benefits at the margin. CBA proponents tend to favor quite comprehensive
consideration of costs and benefits in defining policy goals, including consideration of
future costs and benefits.39
Whether or not policymakers employ CBA in setting environmental goals,
moderate neoliberals tend to favor using "market-based mechanisms," principally
emissions trading and environmental taxation, to achieve these goals. 40 These
mechanisms encourage efficiency in a different sense, the selection of least-cost
technological options for achieving any given environmental goal.4' This framework
implies that private actors, like our Indian entrepreneur, will make their own choices
about how to achieve a defined government goal, such as a target for carbon dioxide
reduction, free of government influence. Thus, market liberalism tends to leave
technological choice to quite narrow private decision making, focusing on costeffective achievement of a government-specified environmental goal.
Market liberalism also embraces free trade, the original efficiency-enhancing
reform. 42 This free trade emphasis tends to lead market liberals to favor not just
emissions trading, but free global trading markets, where credits may be traded across
industries and between countries. Global trading markets enhance opportunities
for
43
cheap emission reductions, thereby lowering environmental protection's cost.

34. See DAVID M. DRiEsEN, THE ECONOMIC DYNAMICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 1 (2003)
(describing the "economics-based regulatory reform agenda" as including increased use of
CBA).
35. See Driesen, supra note 30, at 558 (explaining that CBA requires the comparison of
pollution control costs with "costs" consisting of environmental and health effects).
36. See David M. Driesen, Getting Our PrioritiesStraight: One Strandof the Regulatory
Reform Debate, 31 ENVT'L L. REP. 10003, 10019 n.204 (2001).

37. See Driesen, supra note 30, at 558-59 (noting the difficulty of quantifying these
benefits).
38. See WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & WALLACE E. OATES, THE THEORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICY 23 (1975); Driesen, supra note 30, at 582-83.
39. See THOMAS 0. MCGARiTY, REINVENTING RATIONALITY: THE ROLE OF REGULATORY
ANALYSIS IN THE FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY 5 (1991) (characterizing CBA as supporting

"comprehensive analytical rationality").
40. See DRIESEN, supra note 34, at I (discussing use of "economic incentive" measures to
meet environmental goals as part of the "economics-based regulatory reform agenda").
41. See Driesen, supranote 30, at 564-65 (explaining the difference between allocatively
efficient goal selection and selection of cost-effective means of meeting chosen goals).
42. See David M. Driesen, What is Free Trade: The Real Issue Lurking Behind the Trade
and Environment Debate, 41 VA. J. INT'L L.279, 287-91 (2001) (describing free trade's

classical origins and explaining that modem economists "employ an allocative efficiency test" in
thinking about free trade).
43. See Jonathan Baert Wiener, Global Environmental Regulation: Instrument Choice in
Legal Context, 108 YALE L.J. 677, 748 (1999) (explaining that widening participation in
emissions trading to include developing countries reduces abatement costs).
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Sustainable development, by contrast, generally focuses on adequately meeting the
current generation's basic needs without impairing future generations' ability to meet
their own needs. 44 It reflects some skepticism of the idea that free market actors choose
developmental paths that adequately address either poverty or future generations'
needs. The concept originated in efforts to bridge differences between developing and
developed countries on international law, and numerous international agreements
embrace sustainable development as a goal.45 Definitions of the concept vary and
many scholars lament its lack of precision.46 Scholars studying sustainable
development refer to the consideration of future generations' needs under the rubric of
intergenerational equity.47
Sustainable development involves an emphasis on integrated planning and public
participation.48 This emphasis arises from a distinctive view of the relationship
between economic development and environmental protection. The report often
credited with creating the sustainable development concept, the Brundtland Report,
claims that environmental degradation often impedes economic development and,
conversely, that poverty frequently causes environmental degradation. 49 This view
suggests that proper economic development choices will simultaneously protect the
environment and aid poverty elimination and leads to support for governance reforms
integrating economic development and environmental decision making. Thisview of

44. BRUNDTLAND REPORT, supra note 9, at 54. I have not attempted to provide a
comprehensive account of sustainable development's elements here, but instead focus on the
components most relevant to this Article's thesis. See generally John Martin Gillroy,
Adjudication Norms, Dispute Settlement Regimes and InternationalTribunals: The Status of
"EnvironmentalSustainability" in InternationalJurisprudence, 42 STAN. J. INT'L L. 1, 12
(2006) (identifying eight sustainable development "sub-principles").
45. MARIE-CLAIRE CORDONIER SEGGER & ASHFAQ KHALFAN, SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
LAW: PRINCIPLES, PRACTICES, AND PROSPECTS 15 (2004) (discussing sustainable development's
origins as a "compromise" term); PHILIPPE SANDS, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 252 (2d ed. 2003) (stating that the term sustainable development now

appears regularly in international environmental instruments).
46. See, e.g., BECKERMAN, supra note 21, at xi; SEGGER & KHALFAN, supra note 45, at 4
(explaining that the vagueness of the sustainable development concept helped it gain universal
acceptance, but creates "difficulties").
47. E.g., Kysar, supra note 8, at 2118.
48. See Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, U.N. Conf. on Env't & Dev.,
principle 4, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/6/Rev. 1, 31 I.L.M. 874 (June 16, 1992) (stating that
achievement of sustainable development requires the integration of environmental and
developmental concerns); John C. Dembach, SustainableDevelopment: Now More thanEver, in
STUMBLING TOWARD SUSTAINABILITY 51-53, 56 (John C. Dembach ed., 2002); SANDS, supra
note 45, at 263 (discussing integration of environment and development as an "element" of
sustainable development); SEGGER & KHALFAN, supra note 45, at 3 (explaining that sustainable
development seeks to encourage integrated solutions to our most important problems by
requiring "accommodation between economic development, social justice, and environmental
protection ....through a process requiring public participation").
49. BRUNDTLAND REPORT, supra note 9, at 22.

50. Id. at 25-27 (affirming that it is possible to make development sustainable and then
explaining how this requires broadening the mandates of economic development and
environmental ministries to allow for integrated consideration of the environment and economic
development).
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environmental policy and economic development as complimentary contrasts with
market liberalism's perspective, which tends to view environmental protection as in
conflict with economic development. This leads to a desire to carefully consider
tradeoffs between them and reduce environmental protection's cost. Sustainable
development implies a51significant role for collective decision making, presumably
including government.
B. UnderstandingEmissions Trading
Environmental law has traditionally relied heavily upon uniform performance
standards as a means of meeting environmental goals, 52 which generally require all
53
parts of an industry to achieve a numerically specified emission reduction target.
Economists have criticized this uniform standards approach as inconsistent with the
free market ideal of economic efficiency. 54 Facilities have widely varying control
costs. Accordingly, industry can achieve any aggregate target more cheaply than a
uniform standard allows if facilities with relatively cheap control costs make more of
the aggregate reductions than facilities with high control costs. 55 Emissions trading
ingeniously corrects the failure of traditional government regulation to generate the
cost-effective outcomes hypothesized for an ideal free market. 56 The regulator can set

51. Kysar, supra note 8, at 2147 (stating that sustainable development proponents favor
collective decision making).
52. See Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law, 37
STAN. L. REV. 1333, 1335 (1985) (explaining that environmental law relies heavily upon
uniform standards for industrial categories); e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 7411 (a), 7412(d), 7521 (2000).
But see 33 U.S.C. § 1312 (2000); David M. Driesen, Is Emissions Trading an Economic
Incentive Program?:Beyond the Command and Control/EconomicIncentive Dichotomy, 55
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 289, 308 n.93 (1998) (arguing that commentators have exaggerated the
extent of the uniform standard approach's use); Driesen, supranote 3, at 36-37 (noting that the
Kyoto Protocol does not impose uniform standards upon countries, but explaining why
emissions trading increases cost effectiveness anyway).
53. See Jason S. Johnston, Tradable Pollution Permits and the Regulatory Game, in
MOVING TO MARKETS IN ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LESSONS FROM TWENTY YEARS OF

EXPERIENCE 358 (Jody Freeman & Charles D. Kolstad eds., 2007) [hereinafter MOVING TO
MARKETS] (stating that federal environmental regulations require uniform emission reductions
for facilities of the same approximate age in an industry category).
54. E.g., id. at 353 ("[C]ommand-and-control" regulation has been "widely decried as
inefficient.").
55. Unfortunately, regulators rarely have sufficient marginal cost information to tailor
regulation to each facility's marginal control cost. Cf EMISSIONS TRADINGFOR CLIMATE POLICY:
U.S. AND EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES at 3 (Bemd HansjOrgens ed., 2005) [hereinafter EMISSIONS
TRADING] (explaining that regulators could tailor standards to each firm's marginal abatement
cost, but pointing out the controversial nature of these adjustments).
56. 1use the term "traditional regulation" to refer to performance standards, which require a
particular pollution source to meet a quantitative limit for pollution outputs, and work practice
standards, which dictate use of a particular technology or practice. Some writers use the term
"command and control" regulation in the same way. Driesen, supra note 52, at 297 n.44. I
eschew use of this term, because it misleadingly suggests that performance standards dictate
technological choices or that work practice standards dominate environmental law. See id. at
296-302.
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the same limits as would undergird a traditional regulation but allow facility owners to
buy emission reduction credits from over-complying facilities in lieu of local
reductions. This opportunity will encourage facility owners with cheap pollution
control options to provide extra emission reductions, because they can sell credits
representing the excess reductions to facility owners facing relatively expensive
control options. 57 Conversely, owners of facilities generating high control costs will
avoid making reductions at their own facilities and purchase credits from operators of
facilities with low-cost reduction options instead.58 Thus, emissions trading
encourages
59
a cost-effective shift of reductions from high- to low-cost facilities.
The United States enjoyed its first major success with this "market-based approach"
in the acid rain program enacted as part of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments. 60
Congress assigned emission limits to each electric utility unit generating sulfur
dioxide, a major contributor to acid rain.6 1 But Congress allowed electric utility
operators to purchase extra emission reductions realized at other capped generating
units in lieu of local compliance.62 The program produced significant aggregate sulfur
dioxide reductions at a much lower cost than regulators had anticipated-precisely
what the market liberalism model predicts. 63 Since then, environmental-benefit trading
has taken off, becoming the most ubiquitous approach to meeting environmental
standards in the United States. 64

57. See Geoffrey Bertram, Tradable Emission Permits and the Control of Greenhouse
Gases, 28 J. DEV. STUD. 423,425 (1992).
58. See id.
59. Stewart, supra note 17, at 190 (describing trading as automatically transferring
resources from high-cost to low-cost sources); Driesen, supra note 3, at 36 (illustrating trading's
encouragement of cost-effective reduction shifts with a numerical example).
60. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7651-7651o (2000). See Jacob Kreutzer, Cap and Trade: A Behavioral
Analysis of the Sulfur Dioxide Emissions Market, 62 N.Y.U. ANN. SuRv. AM. L. 125, 129
(2006) (calling the cap and trade program "a success by any measure"); Byron Swift, Command
Without Control: Why Cap-and-TradeShould Replace Rate Standardsfor RegionalPollutants,
31 ENVTL. L. REP. 10330, 10331-32 (2001) (explaining that the acid rain program produced
early reductions and cheaper-than-expected costs). See generallyDriesen, supranote 52, at 31417 & n.131 (reviewing the history of trading prior to 1990).
61. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7651c(e), 7651d (2000).
62. 42 U.S.C. § 765lb(b) (2000).
63. See Choi, supra note 5, at 890 (conceding, in the context of a fairly critical appraisal,
that the acid rain program has achieved its goals); Swift, supra note 60, at 10331-32 (discussing
the reductions and cost savings).
64. See Choi, supranote 5, at 892-94 (claiming that trading has been used frequently in the
United States and providing examples). While other emissions trading programs have failed
because of monitoring and tracking difficulties, this Article will assume, perhaps unwisely, that
the Kyoto trading programs will produce real emission reductions as planned. See id. at 931-33
(explaining that the European Emissions Trading scheme does not require continuous emissions
monitors in all cases). This assumption, whether realistic or not, makes it easier to address the
Article's chief theoretical concern--the relationship between market liberalism and sustainable
development.
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C. Emissions Trading in the Climate Change Regime

Meanwhile, scientific evidence mounted that greenhouse gases, especially carbon
dioxide, a byproduct of fossil fuel combustion, had warmed the earth's average mean
surface temperature and would likely increase warming in the future. 65 Recent
66
scientific papers show that global warming has already begun melting glaciers,
raising sea levels, 67 and intensifying hurricanes. 68 But the scientific literature raises
even more concerns about what future generations might face if the current generation
does not safeguard their welfare. The literature predicts that rising sea levels will
inundate coastal areas and small island states. 69 It predicts more violent future weather
events, droughts in areas where many people already suffer from malnutrition, and the
proliferation of tropical diseases in areas where they have hitherto afflicted no one.70
Global warming may also lead to rapid ecological changes accelerating many species'
extinction. 7'

65. DESSLER & PARSON, supra note 1, at 8-10 (explaining that carbon dioxide and water
vapor are the principal greenhouse gases and that by the 1980s evidence had mounted that
temperatures were warming); Zachary Tyler, Massachusetts v. EPA: The D.C. Circuit'sFailure
to Extend the Clean Air Act to GreenhouseGas Emissions, 36 ENVTL. L. REP. 10456, 10457
(2006) (explaining the link between fossil fuel combustion and carbon dioxide).
66. GERMAN ADVISORY COUNCIL ON GLOBAL CHANGE, THE FUTURE OCEANS-WARMING

UP, RISING HIGH, TURNING SOUR 2 (2006) [hereinafter WBGU] ("There are indications that the
continental ice sheets on Greenland and in the Antarctic are beginning to disintegrate.").
67. Id. at I (stating that "the sea level is rising ever faster"); INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL
ON CLIMATE CHANGE, WORKING GROUP I, supranote 6, at4 (finding that sea levels have risen by
four to eight inches over the last 100 years).
68. WBGU, supra note 66, at 2 (stating that both "observed data" and "mathematical
models" show that global warming boosts hurricanes' "destructive energy"); Kerry Emanuel,
IncreasingDestructiveness of Tropical Cyclones over the Past 30 Years, 436 NATURE 686
(2005) (showing a correlation between the increased destructiveness of tropical cyclones and
average mean surface temperature). See generally DESSLER & PARSON, supra note 1, at 83
(explaining that because the strength of tropical cyclones depends on sea surface temperatures,
"there is [a] good basis" to expect more intense hurricanes and typhoons).
69. INTEGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, WORKING GROUP H, Vulnerability to

Climate Change and Reasonsfor Concern:A Synthesis, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2001: IMPACTS,
ADAPTATION,
AND
VULNERABILITY
ch.
19.3.4.1
(2001),
available at
http://www.grida.no/climate/ ipcc tar/wg2/pdf/wg2TARchapl9.pdf(discussing the vulnerability
of Antigua, the Cook Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, Kiribati, the Maldives, the
Marshall Islands, Nevis, Tonga, and Tuvalu); WBGU, supra note 66, at 2 ("Sea-level rise will
lead to inundation of coasts and small island states .... ").
70. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE
SCIENCE BASIS: SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS 7-9 (2007), available at
http://www.grida.no/ (discussing links between global climate change and droughts, increased
extreme weather, and sea level rise); NICHOLAS STERN, THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE:
PHYSICAL

THE STERN REVIEW 74 (2007) (discussing the spread of infectious diseases); Robert L.
Glicksman, GlobalClimate Changeand the Risks to CoastalAreasfrom HurricanesandRising
Sea Levels: The Costs of Doing Nothing, 52 LOY. L. REv. 1127 (2006) (discussing violent
weather events and other effects).
71.

ELIZABETH KOLBERT, FIELD NOTES FROM A CATASTROPHE: MAN, NATURE, AND

CLMATE CHANGE 88 (2006) (reporting biologists' preliminary estimate of species extinction as
between 15 percent and 37 percent); see also IPCC WORKING GROUP H, supra note 69, ch.
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The international community responded to the mounting scientific evidence that
human activities seriously disrupt the global climate by enacting the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change ("Framework Convention") in 1992.72 The
Framework Convention reflects both international support for the sustainable
development ideal and market liberalism's ascendancy.
The Framework Convention proclaims that "[t]he Parties... should.., promote
sustainable development" 73 and "protect the climate system for the benefit of future
generations. 74 This proclamation is consistent with the intergenerational concerns at
the heart of sustainable development. 75 The general goal more concretely expresses
sustainable development's possible meaning in this context by declaring an "ultimate
objective" of stabilizing "greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level
76
that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.
The Framework Convention simultaneously embraces market liberalism by stating
that "policies and measures to deal with climate change should be cost-effective so as
to ensure global benefits at the lowest possible cost."'77 Employing the language of
neoliberal CBA proponents, this clause refers to measures reducing greenhouse gas
emissions not as avoiding harm, but as ensuring "benefits. 78 At the same time, this
language suggests the need for emissions trading by establishing cost-effectiveness as
a major objective of the climate change regime. 79 This language did not enter the
agreement by accident. The United States, a leading bastion of market liberalism,
resisted mandatory emission reduction targets, partially because it considered their
achievement too costly.80 United States negotiators also argued that liberal

19.2.2.2 (discussing elevational shifts in species and earlier timing of reproduction); Shari L.
Diener, Note, Ratification of Kyoto Aside: How InternationalLaw and Market Uncertainty
Obviate the Current US. Approach to Climate Change Emissions, 47 WM. & MARY L. REv.
2089,2093 (2006) (discussing studies predicting "devastating consequences" for polar bears and

certain seals).
72. U.N. Conference on Env't & Dev., New York, U.S., May 29, 1992, Framework
Convention on Climate Change, U.N. Doc. A/AC.237/18 (1992), 31 I.L.M. 849 [hereinafter
FCCC]. See generally Daniel Bodansky, The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change: A Commentary, 18 YALE J. INT'L L. 451 (1993).
73. FCCC, supra note 72, art. 3, para. 4.
74. Id. art. 3, para. I.
75.

See generally EDITH BROWN WEISS, IN FAIRNESS TO FUTURE GENERATIONS:

INTERNATIONAL LAW, COMMON PATRIMONY, AND INTERGENERATIONAL EQUITY (1989).

76. FCCC, supra note 72, art. 2.
77. Id. art. 3, para. 3.
78. Cf Driesen, supra note 30, at 560-61 & n.67 (pointing out that cost-benefit proponents
use the word "benefits" to describe averted harms).
79. See SANDS, supranote 45, at 365-66 (linking the joint implementation provision to the
Framework Convention's language on cost effectiveness); Driesen, supra note 3, at 15-18
(explaining that the language surrounding the cost effectiveness principle seems to qualify it, but
that "cost effectiveness concerns have tended to dominate debates about implementation of the
Climate Change Convention").
80. SANDS, supra note 45, at 360 (stating that the United States publicly opposed specific
targets and timetables for greenhouse gas emission reductions); see also James E. Beard, Note,
An Application of the Principles ofSustainability to the Problem of Global Climate Change: An
Argumentfor IntegratedEnergy Services, 11 J. ENvTL. L. & LITIG. 191,203 (1996) (discussing
the U.S. effort to defeat a proposal for a twenty percent emissions cut).
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international emissions trading should become part of the agreement. 81 This position
created a tension between the United States and countries more interested in binding
limits and skeptical of emissions trading.8 2 This tension led to a clause establishing an
"aim of returning individually orjointly to ...

1990" developed country greenhouse

gas emission levels. 83 This language established an emission reduction goal in lieu of
an emission reduction requirement.8 4 And the reference to joint achievement of the
stabilization "aim" suggests using international emissions trading to achieve this
goal.85
The United States continued its emissions trading advocacy and its opposition to
binding emission reduction targets during the meetings that produced the Kyoto
Protocol.86 This placed the United States in tension with the European Union (EU),
which supported strict targets and less use of trading. 87 Then Vice President Al Gore
helped break an impasse that threatened to scuttle a Kyoto agreement by signaling the
United States' willingness to accept modest binding emission reduction targets in
exchange for a liberal international emissions trading regime. 88 The resulting Kyoto
Protocol generally obligates advanced, industrialized countries to deliver emission
reductions representing a five percent cut below their joint 1990 emission levels, but it
allows them to substitute carbon credits generated abroad for some of these cuts.89

81. See Diener, supra note 71, at 2101 (attributing the inclusion of some trading provisions
to "U.S. pressure").
82. See SANDS, supra note 45, at 365 (pointing out that the European Union and other
countries supported a clear commitment to stabilizing greenhouse gas emissions at 1990 levels).
83. FCCC, supra note 72, art. 4, para. 2(b) (emphasis added); see PRUE TAYLOR, AN
ECOLOGICAL APPROACH TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 332 (1998) (describing this compromise as a
"watering down of obligations" achieved through a U.S. threat to boycott the talks).
84. See Bodan sky, supranote 72, at 515-17 (describing this clause as establishing a "quasitarget").
85. See Driesen, supra note 3, at 28 (explaining that the "joint implementation" language
suggests authorization of trading, but could also be interpreted as contemplating one country
helping another achieve reductions without credit sales).
86. See DESSLER & PARSON, supra note 1, at 14 (discussing the Clinton Administration's
initial reluctance to accept mandatory emission reductions).
87. See id. at 15 (describing the tension between the United States and the EU on the
liberality of trading); Axel Michaelowa & Sonja Butzengeiger, EU Emissions Trading:
NavigatingBetween Scylla and Charybdis, 5 CLIMATE POL'Y 1, 2 (2005) (noting that the EU
opposed international trading in the "run-up" to the Kyoto conference).
88. Joby Warrick, Gore Urges Resolution at Climate Talks with Summit in Disarray,Vice
PresidentProds U.S. Negotiatorsto Bridge Gaps, WASH. POST, Dec. 8, 1998, at A I (describing
the U.S. compromise accepting a seven percent reduction target); see also James H. Searles,
Analysis ofthe Kyoto Protocolto the U.N. Framework Conventionon Climate Change,21 INT'L
ENV'T REP. 131, 133 (Feb. 4, 1998) (stating that the United States demanded emissions trading
in exchange for legally binding emissions reductions).
89. Kyoto Protocol, supranote 2, art. 3(1) (requiring industrialized countries to reduce their
emissions by the amounts assigned in annex B "with a view to reducing their overall emissions
of such gases by at least 5 per cent below 1990 levels"); see also Kyoto PartiesEnd Meetings
with Consensusfor Avoiding 'Gap' in Post-2012 Reductions, 37 ENvTL. REP. 1154 (2006)
("[The Kyoto Protocol] requires 36 industrialized countries.. . to collectively reduce carbon
dioxide emissions by about 5 percent below 1990 levels ... ").
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The Kyoto Protocol provides for no fewer than three international emission trading
programs, usually referred to as the Kyoto "flexibility mechanisms," as a means of
0
achieving the reduction targets for individual countries. 9 Article 16 authorizes trades
of national allowances among the developed countries that assumed reduction
obligations under the Kyoto Protocol. 9' Article 6, the joint implementation provision,
authorizes project-based trades among developed countries or among private parties
within developed countries. 92 Article 12 establishes a Clean Development Mechanism
(CDM) that authorizes developed countries, or private companies within developed
countries, to purchase credits from projects in developing countries, even though
developing countries have assumed no emission reduction obligations under the Kyoto
is to assist developing countries in "achieving
Protocol.93 The CDM's purpose
94
development."
sustainable
In order to meet CDM's sustainable development goals, the parties to the Kyoto
Protocol established a process for public participation and collective decision making
in choosing CDM projects. 95 This process requires Designated Operational Entities
(often a private consulting firm paid for by project developers) to comment on
proposed projects, estimate emission reductions, and validate the subsequent
emissions. 96 A Designated National Authority within the country hosting the project
97
reviews the project for compatibility with sustainable development goals. An
Executive Board reviews credit estimation techniques and exercises
international
98
oversight.
D. Implementation
President George W. Bush renounced the Kyoto Protocol shortly after coming into
office, thereby depriving the climate change regime of support from the world's largest
greenhouse gas emitter. 99 Despite this setback, the Kyoto Protocol entered into force in

90. See LEGAL ASPECTS OF IMPLEMENTING THE KYOTO PROTOCOL MECHANISMS: MAKING
KYOTO WORK 175 (David Freestone & Charlotte Streck eds., 2005) [hereinafter KYOTO
MECHANISMS] (introducing Joint Implementation, Emissions Trading, and the Clean
Development Mechanism as the three "market-oriented mechanisms" provided for in the Kyoto
Protocol); SANDS, supra note 45, at 372 (listing the flexibility mechanisms as "emissions
trading, joint implementation, and the [Clean Development Mechanism]"); cf Stewart, supra
note 17, at 238 (interpreting the Kyoto Protocol as providing four different economic incentive
systems).
91. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 2, art. 16.
92. Id. art. 6.
93. Id. art. 12.
94. Id.art. 12(2). The CDM also aims to contribute to achieving the Framework
Convention's objective of avoiding dangerous climate change and assisting developed countries
in complying with their emission reduction obligations. Id.
95. See generally KYOTO MECHANISMS, supra note 90, at 71-104.
96. Id. at 198-202 (describing the role of Designated Operational Entities).
97. Id. at 213-19 (explaining that the role of the Designated National Authority includes
review for sustainability).
98. Id. at 197, 202 (stating that the Executive Board reviews projects for environmental
integrity).
99. See id. at 370 (stating that Bush's repudiation of the Kyoto Protocol cast its passage into
doubt, because it required virtually all other Annex I parties to ratify the Protocol to bring it into
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100
2005, and most of the world's developed countries have begun to implement it.
Because of the U.S. federal government's absence,' 01 the EU and its member
states
10 2
have become the most important actors in shaping Kyoto implementation.

1. The European Union's Emissions Trading Scheme
As we saw, the EU reluctantly accepted a global trading regime in the hopes of
obtaining reductions from the United States in return. Even though the effort to
combine market liberalism and sustainable development under the Kyoto canopy
attempts something of a shotgun wedding,10 104 3 the EU moved rapidly to adopt a trading
scheme after it signed the Kyoto accord.
The European Parliament adopted a two-phased trading program requiring
individual countries to establish limits for the carbon dioxide emissions of listed major
industrial sources, such as power plants.' 05This trading program, however, does not
confine itself to trades between capped sources in Europe. It allows regulated
European polluters to purchase credits generated by projects approved under the Kyoto
Protocol's CDM and Joint Implementation provisions to satisfy part of their
force); George W. Bush, U.S. President, Press Conference at the White House (Mar. 29,2001),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/03/20010329.html (explaining
Bush's concerns about cost and the ineffectiveness of the agreement). Congress has also not
been forthcoming with U.S. support for international climate change agreements. See, e.g., S.
Res. 98, 105th Cong. (1997) (enacted) (disapproving of climate change agreements that do not
mandate developing country emission reductions and expressing cost concerns).
100. See DESSLER & PARSON, supranote 1, at 16 (noting that the Kyoto Protocol entered into
force on February 16, 2005).
101. Kirsten H. Engel, MitigatingGlobal Climate Change in the United States:A Regional
Approach, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 54, 55 (2005) (noting "the absence of the federal
government's participation in the Kyoto Protocol"); see also Kirsten H. Engel & Scott R.
Saleska, The SubglobalRegulation of the Global Commons: The Case of Climate Change, 32
ECOLOGY L.Q. 183, 186 (2005) (pointing out that the U.S. federal government has "eschewed
substantive regulation in favor of voluntary reduction efforts and a continuation of scientific
research on climate"); cf Gary C. Bryner, Carbon Markets: Reducing Greenhouse Gas
Emissions Through Emissions Trading, 17 TUL. ENvTL. L.J. 267,273 (2004) (describing the

Bush Administration's plan to address climate change without meeting Kyoto targets); Deborah
Keeth, Note, The CaliforniaClimateLaw: A State'sCuttingEdge Efforts to Achieve CleanAir,
30 ECOLOGY L.Q. 715 (2003) (discussing California climate change law).
102. See Choi, supra note 5, at 952 (stating that the European Emissions Trading Scheme

"will provide important lessons to the rest of the world," including the United States).
103. See Michael A. Mehling, Emissions Trading and NationalAllocation in the Member
States-An Achilles'Heel of European Climate Policy?, 5 Y.B. EUR. ENVTL. L. 113, 118-19
(2005) (describing emissions trading as something "[largely adopted in response" to U.S.
"pressure").

104. See id. at 123, 127 (describing the EU decision to adopt trading after "notoriously"
opposing it as a "remarkable shift" and noting that it moved from proposal to adoption in "less
than four years").
105. Council Directive 2003/87, 2003 O.J. (L 275) (EC). See generallyBent 0. Mortensen,
The EU Emission Trading Directive, 14 Eut. ENVTL. L. REv. 275 (2004) (discussing the

directive and how it helps the European Union meet Kyoto Protocol objectives); Rie Watanabe
& Guy Robinson, The European Union Emissions TradingScheme, 5 CLIMATE POL'Y 10 (2005)
(explaining the particulars of the scheme).

2008]

EMISSIONS TRADING UNDER THE KYOTO PROTOCOL

37

compliance obligations. 0 6 The European Parliament adopted this global liberalization
of the trading regime specifically to advance the sustainable development goal by
facilitating resource transfers to developing countries and to further the cost07
effectiveness goal by increasing the availability of cheap credits.' Thus, the EU
embraced, to a remarkable degree, the marriage of sustainable development and
market liberalism, even though the country seeking the marriage, the United States,
had absconded. 108
2. Alternatives to Global Trading
The EU, however, has not relied upon global trading as the sole means of meeting
its Kyoto goals. 10 9 The EU has established targets for increased use of renewable
energy."1 Member countries have sought to achieve these targets primarily through
two energy regulatory mechanisms, often coupled with some form of tax incentive.
Many countries (and many states in the United States) employ renewable energy
portfolio standards that require electric utilities to obtain a fixed percentage of their
energy from renewable sources."'1 Typically, a renewable portfolio standard allows an

106. Council Directive 2004/101, pmbl., 2004 O.J. (L 338) 18 (EC) [hereinafter Linking
Directive]; Watanabe & Robinson, supra note 105, at 12-13.
107. Linking Directive, supra note 106, at 18.
108. Reimund Schwarze, Incentives to Adopt New Abatement Technologyand US-European
Regulatory Cultures, in EMiSSIONs TRADING, supranote 55, at 58 (likening the EU to a hesitant
bride expecting a baby after the father has left).
109. See Mehling, supra note 103, at 121-22 (describing legislation on energy efficiency,
renewable energy, energy taxation, funding and promotion schemes, voluntary agreements with
industry, and monitoring of greenhouse gas emissions as following in the wake of a Europe
Commission decision to make climate change a priority in 1992).
110. Commission of the EuropeanCommunities, Commission Staff Working Document: The
Share of Renewable Energy in the EU: Country Profiles: Overview of Renewable Energy
Sources in the EnlargedEU,at 3, COM (2004) 366 final (May 26,2004) (discussing the EU's
target of a twelve percent share of renewable energy consumption by 2010); Commission ofthe
European Communities, The Share of Renewable Energy in the EU: Commission Report in
Accordance with Article 3 of Directive 2001/77/EC, Evaluation of the Effect of Legislative
Instruments and Other Community Policies on the Development of the Contribution of
Renewable Energy Resources in the EU andProposalsfor ConcreteActions, at 12, COM (2004)
366 final (May 26, 2004) [hereinafter 2004 Commission Energy Evaluation] (discussing an
"indicative target" of twenty-two percent renewable electricity generation by 2010 for the EU
fifteen).
111.

BARRY G. RABE, RACE TO THE Top: THE EXPANDING ROLE OF U.S. STATE RENEWABLE

PORTFOLIO STANDARDs 3-4 (2006) (listing states and countries that have adopted renewable
portfolio standards); Andrew Ford, Klaus Vogstad & Hilary Flynn, Stimulating PricePatterns
for Tradable Green Certificatesto Promote Electricity Generationfrom Wind, 35 ENERGY
POL'Y 91, 92-94 (2007) (describing state programs and mentioning the European countries
employing similar programs); Kevin S. Golden, Senate Bill 1078: The Renewable Portfolio
Standard-CaliforniaAsserts its Renewable Energy Leadership, 30 ECOLOGY L.Q. 693, 699
(2003) (describing renewable energy portfolio standards as requirements that "retail electricity
sellers" include "a determined percentage of renewable energy sources" in their "resource
portfolios"); see Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the
Commission: The Support ofElectricityfrom Renewable Energy Sources, at 4-5, COM (2005)
627 final [hereinafter Renewables Support] (listing countries employing green certificate
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electricity retailer to comply by using power from its own renewable energy facility,
by purchasing power from another renewable energy facility, or by buying a renewable
energy credit.12 In Europe, even more countries use feed-in tariffs, which require
electricity providers to pay renewable energy providers a fixed premium for their
energy.113 This approach relies on an economic incentive as a means of meeting a goal
for technological change. But this approach also relies on a "distortion" of the "natural
market"-basically government price fixing-to achieve sustainable development
goals.114 Thus, Europe has employed both feed-in tariffs (a price mechanism)
and
5
production quotas (a quantity mechanism) to encourage renewable energy.'
systems, which can be a form of renewable portfolio standards); Espey, supra note 5, at 560
(explaining that the term renewable portfolio standard comes from U.S. practice, but that other
countries employ different names to describe similar programs). See generallyNANCY RADER&
SCOTT HEMPLING, THE RENEWABLES PORTFOLIO STANDARD: A PRACTICAL GUIDE (2001)
(discussing how decision makers can use renewable portfolio standards to achieve policy goals).
112. N.H. VAN DER LINDEN, M.A. UYTERLINDE, C. VROLIJK, L.J. NILSSON, J. KHAN, K.
ASTRAND, K. ERICSSON & R. WISER, REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE WITH RENEWABLE
ENERGY OBLIGATIONS SUPPORT MECHANISMS 49 (2005) (noting that suppliers usually purchase
tradable renewable energy credits from suppliers of renewable energy in order to meet their own
compliance obligations); RYAN WISER & OLE LANGNISS, THE RENEWABLES PORTFOLIO
STANDARD IN TEXAS: AN EARLY ASSESSMENT 15 (2001), http://www.rff.org/Documents/RFFRPT-Renewables.pdf(stating that certificate trades "may not be essential to effective design" of
a renewable portfolio standard); Engel, supra note 5, at 268 n.72 (noting that only one state,
Arizona, currently uses tradable renewable power credits); Espey, supra note 5, at 557
(describing "certificates" as a means of proving compliance with a renewable portfolio
standard); Ford et al., supranote 11, at 94 (characterizing tradable green certificates markets as
"quite new"); Golden, supra note 11, at 699-700. Espey further explains that because a utility
can acquire a certificate without acquiring the underlying power, the certificate system allows a
utility to participate in financing renewable energy without acquiring a production facility or
obtaining the renewable power. Espey, supranote 5, at 560. This separation can both simplify
enforcement and provide flexibility for those complying with a renewables portfolio obligation.
See generally RADER & HEMPLING, supra note 111, at 55-71 (discussing trading's potential
uses). While the green certificates have a number of advantages, the evidence suggests that the
quotas themselves, not the trading, have spurred the technological development.
113. Renewables Support,supra note 111, at 4 (noting that most EU member states employ
feed-in tariffs); Ford et al., supra note 111, at 94 n.12; see also KAREN PALMER & DALLAS
BURTRAW, ELECTRICITY, RENEWABLES, AND CLIMATE CHANGE: SEARCHING FOR A COSTEFFECTIVE POLICY 8-9 (2004), http://www.rff.org/Documents/RFF-RPT-Renewables.pdf
(discussing feed-in tariffs' use in several European countries). Feed-in tariffs constitute a
subsidy and as such bear some similarity to the Federal Production Tax Credit.
114. RENEWABLE ENERGY CERTIFICATES SYSTEM INTERNATIONAL, THE USE OF GUARANTEE
OF ORIGIN24-25 (2005), http://www.recs.org/doctree/RECS%20International/05%2OEvaluation
%20Report.pdf (explaining that a fixed feed-in tariff introduces a "market distortion").
115. See PALMER & BURTRAW, supranote 113, at 3 (discussing state subsidies and funded by
a surcharge on electricity purchases and federal renewable energy production tax credits); VAN
DERLINDENETAL., supra note 112, at 11-12 (discussing feed-in tariffs, a tendering system with
government contracts for renewable power, financial incentives, and tax incentives); Lene
Nielsen & Tim Jeppesen, Tradable Green Certificates in Selected European CountriesOverview and Assessment, 31 ENERGY POL'Y 3, 5 (2003) (noting that all countries planning
green certificate programs except the Netherlands "envisage . . . politically determined
demand"). See generallyWiener, supranote 43, at 706-713 (developing the distinction between
price and quantity instruments with examples).
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The European Commission has also proposed shifting transport taxation to focus on
this reform, several
carbon."16 While the European Parliament has not yet adopted
17
member states have employed relevant green energy taxes.'
3. The Emerging U.S. Program
While the United States has not yet agreed to Kyoto targets, several states have
introduced programs addressing greenhouse gas emissions." 8 These programs, like
their European counterparts, involve a mixture of emissions trading and other
120
approaches.1 9 And pending federal legislation relies heavily on emissions trading.
This Article cannot catalogue all developed country efforts to meet Kyoto targets.
But this brief description of a few key programs illustrates an important predicate for
subsequent discussion, that most countries have combined global emissions trading
with other more targeted approaches.
II. TECHNOLOGICAL CHOICES UNDER THE KYOTO PROTOCOL

Our Indian entrepreneur is not alone in making technological choices. Other credit
generators must decide between projects generating renewable energy (like the solar
project), projects employing end-of-the-pipe approaches (like the HFC 23 project), and
projects enhancing energy efficiency (which indirectly reduce carbon dioxide
emissions). Also, private actors make technological changes in responding to
renewable portfolio standards and other measures aimed at stimulating greenhouse gas
emissions reductions. What sorts of choices have people made under the Kyoto
Protocol?

116. CommissionProposalfora CouncilDirectiveon PassengerCarRelated Taxes, at 7-8,

COM (2005) 261 final (July 5, 2005), availableat http://ec.europa.eu/environment/co2/pdf/
taxationcorn_2005_261 .pdf.
117. See Choi, supra note 5, at 896-97 (discussing "green taxes" in the European energy
sector); David M. Driesen, Economic Instruments for Sustainable Development, in
ENVIRON MENTAL LAW FOR SUSTArNABILITY: A READER 295 (Stepan Wood & Benjamin J.
Richardson eds., 2006) (discussing taxes touted as carbon taxes in several European countries).
118. Engel, supra note 101, at 54 (describing state and local government as "taking the lead
in addressing global climate change"); Engel & Saleska, supranote 101, at 184-86 (stating that

"at least half the states" have passed legislation addressing global warming). See generally
G. RABE, STATEHOUSE AND GREENHOUSE: THE EMERGING POLITICS OF AMERICAN
CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY (2004).
119. Engel, supra note 101, at 65-68 (discussing various regional initiatives); Engel &
Saleska, supra note 101, at 212-13 (discussing vehicle emissions standards and renewable
BARRY

energy programs).
120. See David M. Driesen, The Changing Climatefor United States Law, 1 CARBON &
CLIMATE L. REv. 35, 36 (2007) (stating that "a number of bills pending in Congress... use the
emissions trading approach"); see, e.g., Climate Stewardship and Innovation Act of 2007, S.
280, 110th Cong. (2007); S. 3698, 109th Cong. (2006).
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A. Technological Choices Generatedby Global Emissions Trading

A survey of technological responses to the Kyoto Protocol's project-based
mechanisms suggests that those in our Indian entrepreneur's position have made a
variety of choices. A quick glance at the projects list might suggest that renewable
energy projects have dominated, since they constitute the majority of projects., 2 I
But a more careful analysis suggests much more emphasis on end-of-the-pipe
approaches than on renewable energy or energy efficiency. End-of-the-pipe22
approaches have generated the lion's share of credits available in the market.'
Indeed, HFC control projects alone, like the project our entrepreneur
contemplated,
123
generated almost half of the total CDM credits generated so far.
The graph below reflects the distribution of credits sold thus far under the Kyoto
Protocol's CDM.124 It shows end-of-the-pipe controls' predominance with a relatively
small percentage of credits produced by renewable energy. 125
If one examines somewhat less reliable numbers for projects "in the pipeline" (i.e.
not yet fully approved) for CDM only, renewable energy credits rise to about twenty-

121. CAPOOR & AMBROSI, supra note 7, at 33 (stating that fifty-one percent of the projects
generating transactions have involved energy efficiency or renewable energy).
122. Michael Wara, Is the Global CarbonMarket Working?, 445 NATURE 595,596 (2007)
(showing that waste gas projects account for the majority of credits claimed for projects "inthe
pipeline"); Baumert,supra note 3, at 386 (noting that "gas capture/destruction projects" account
for "sixty-six percent of expected emissions reduction credits").
123. Robin Lancaster, BeyondAll Expectation,CARBON FIN., May 2006, at 15 (stating that
HFC23 reductions accounted for fifty-eight percent of the market volume between January 2005
and March 2006); Joergen Fenhann & Adrian Lema, UNEP Risoe Center: Contentof CDM/JI
Pipeline: CDM Projects by Type (July 2007), http://cdmpipeline.org/cdm-projects-type.htm
(showing that HFC projects generated forty-nine percent of the credits).
124. Joergen Fenhann, UNEP Risoe Center: CDM/JI Pipeline: Analysis and Database: CDM
Pipeline Overview (July 2007), http://cdmpipeline.org/publications/CDMpipeline.xls
[hereinafter Fenhann CDM Pipeline]; see also UNEP RISOE CENTER: GUIDANCE TOTHECDM/JI
1 (2006), http://cdmpipeline.org/publications/GuidanceCDMpipeline.pdf [hereinafter CDM/JI
GUIDE] (explaining that data comes from the UNFCC homepage located at
http://cdm.unfccc.int/index.html, and also that project design documents are also available
there).
125. Fenhann CDM Pipeline, supra note 124, at tbl.10 (providing analysis of all CDM/JI
projects in the pipeline). The "other" category in this chart and the subsequent JI chart denotes
technologies that are not known to involve end-of-the-pipe, renewable efficiency, or energy
efficiency technologies. The "other" category includes some projects that might be properly
viewed as end-of-the-pipe projects, so that the percentage of end-of-the-pipe credits may be
understated. The finding that renewables projects generate only a modest percentage of the total
credits is broadly consistent with other analysts' conclusions. Lars Friberg, Gudrun Benecke &
Miriam Schr6der, KyotoPlus-Papers:The Role of the CleanDevelopmentMechanism-Now and
in the Future II (KyotoPlus-Escaping the Climate Trap 2006), http://www.sfbgovernance.de/
teilprojekte/projektbereich_d/d3/fribergetal.pdf (noting that renewables have seen a recent
increase only because developers are beginning to run out of viable end-of-the-pipe projects);
e.g., Michael Wara, Measuring the Clean Development Mechanism's Performance and
Potential23 (The Program on Energy and Sustainable Dev. at Stan. Univ., Working Paper No.
56, 2006), available at http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/2121 l/WaraCDM.pdf (stating that
renewables have generated eighteen percent of the total credits).

2008]

EMISSIONS TRADING UNDER THE KYOTO PROTOCOL

41

five percent by 2012.126 The Kyoto Clean Development Mechanism has stimulated
even fewer energy efficiency credits than renewable energy credits, since energy
efficiency projects have generated just ten percent of the total credits.
Distribution of Total CDM Credits Issued Through July 18,2007

Other
91%

Energy Efficiencies
10%

Renewables
17%

End of the Pipe
64%

Sustainable development advocates have used the public participation provisions in
project approval processes to oppose projects promising no additional carbon benefit
and to address broader concerns about some projects' collateral consequences for poor
people in host countries. For example, these advocates have expressed concerns about
ecological destruction and chemical contamination associated with a eucalyptus

126. Lucy Mortimer, An unCERtain Path?, CARBON FIN., Apr. 2006, at 14, available at
http://www.carbon-financeonline.com (noting that many projects may not make it through the
registration process because of financial problems, methodological problems, and uncertainty
about the post-2012 carbon market); Ben Pearson, MarketFailure:Why the CleanDevelopment
Mechanism Won't Promote Clean Development, 15 J. CLEANER PROD. 247,248 (2007) (noting
that many renewables projects may not meet the Kyoto Protocol's "additionality" criterion).
Similarly, the smaller joint implementation mechanism pipeline's renewable energy credits
constitute about nineteen percent of total projected credits. KARAN CAPOOR & PHILIPPE
AMBROSI,
STATE AND TRENDS OF THE CARBON MARKET 2007 28 (2007),
http://carbonfmance.org/docs/ CarbonTrends 2007-_FINAL_-_May_2.pdf; Fenhann CDM
Pipeline, supra note 124, at tbl. l0 (showing that projected renewable energy credits will reach
twenty-five percent in 2012). Furthermore, renewables project developers may face greater risks
of having their projects' emission credits disapproved or reduced than developers of cheaper
projects. JANE ELLIS & SAMI KAMEL, OVERCOMING BARRIERS TO CLEAN DEVELOPMENT
MECHANISM PROJECTS 10 (2007), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/51/14/38684304.pdf; Joergen
Fenhann, UNEP Risoe CDM/JI Pipeline: Analysis and Database: JI Pipeline Overview (July
2007), http://cdmpipeline.org/ publications/Jlpipeline.xls. Conversely, analysts expect end-ofthe-pipe control's share of future project credits to decline to about forty percent of the total.
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plantation that generates carbon and displaces biofuel, as well as providing incentives
to keep a landfill slated for closure open in order to allow methane capture for
credit. 127 The CDM Executive Board has sometimes revised or rejected emissions
estimates on the grounds that they exaggerate the carbon benefits or involve no
additional carbon benefit from baseline conditions. 128 But public participation aimed at
furthering sustainable
development has not reversed the market trend favoring end-of129
the-pipe control.

B. Technological Choices Under More TargetedPrograms

By contrast with global trading's emphasis on end-of-the-pipe strategies, more
targeted regulatory programs have increased the use of renewable energy and energy
efficiency. 130 On the renewable energy front, targeted regulatory programs have
catalyzed an enormous increase in wind power.' 31 These programs have encouraged
technological developments that have caused a drop in price, which has made wind
power a cost-effective energy source.' 32 Photovoltaic module production for solar

127. E.g., JIM VALLETTE, DAPHNE WYSHAM & NADIA MARTINEZ, A WRONG TURNFROM RIO:
THE WORLD BANK'S ROAD TO CLIMATE CATASTROPHE 9-10 (2004), http://www.seen.org/PDFs/
WrongturnRio.pdf (describing these projects and their effects). Contra The World Bank
Carbon Finance Unit, Brazil: Plantar Sequestration and Biomass Use (2006), http://carbon
finance.org/Router.cfln?Page=Projport&ProjlD=9600#DocsList (suggesting that the Plantar
project will lessen ecological destruction). The point here is not to determine who is right about
project disputes, but simply to characterize the types of concerns that come up in public
comment processes on CDM projects.
128. See, e.g., CDM WATCH, THE WORLD BANK AND THE CARBON MARKET: RHETORIC
AND REALITY,23-25, availableat http://www.cdmwatch.org/files/
World%20Bank%20paper%2Ofinal.pdf, at (describing the reasons for rejection of some
CDM projects).
129. David M. Driesen, Air Pollution,in STUMBLING TOWARD SUSTAINABILITY, supra note
48, at 257-61 (discussing Agenda 21's provisions favoring renewable energy and energy
efficiency as part of sustainable development); cf U.N. Conference on Env't & Dev., Rio de
Janerio, Brazil, June 3-14, 1992, Agenda 21, 9.9, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (calling for a
greater need to rely on renewable energy sources).
130. James W. Moeller, Of Credits and Quotas: Federal Tax Incentives for Renewable
Resources, State Renewable Portfolio Standards,and the Evolution ofProposalsfor a Federal
Renewable Portfolio Standard, 15 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 69, 73-77 (2004) (explaining that a
federal requirement that electric utilities purchase power from renewable energy sources played
an important role in expanding renewable power generation); e.g., VANDERLINDENETAL., supra

note 112, at 38 (suggesting that a number of policy instruments have contributed to increased
renewable energy production in Sweden). ContraChoi, supra note 5, at 891 n.86 (claiming that
the acid rain program has discouraged use of renewable energy, in spite of the establishment of
reserve allowances to provide incentives to use it).
131. 2004 Commission Energy Evaluation, supra note 110, at 19 (noting that wind power
grew by twenty-three percent in 2003, exceeding the EU's wind target); Ford et al., supra note
11, at 92 n.4 (explaining that the Texas renewable portfolio standard produced the "Texas
Wind Rush," the installation of ten new wind projects in 2001 producing 930 megawatts of
power); Frederic C. Menz & Stephan Vachon, The Effectiveness ofDifferent PolicyRegimesfor
PromotingWind Power: Experiencesfrom the States, 34 ENERGY POL'Y 1786 (2006) (finding
that renewable portfolio standards have stimulated increased production of wind power).
132. 2004 Commission Energy Evaluation, supra note 110, at 19 (finding that wind costs
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33
energy has also increased markedly in Europe.' And the prices for solar and biomass
technologies have dropped over time, although usually34 not to levels that make them
cost competitive with heavily subsidized fossil fuels.'
We have also seen an obvious innovation in vehicle technology, as many
companies have begun offering hybrid vehicles that reduce reliance on gasoline, using
a battery's electricity to help power the vehicle. These vehicles typically offer
35
increased energy efficiency and reduced carbon dioxide emissions. 1 Manufacturers
have introduced hybrids in order to comply with California regulations requiring Low
Emissions Vehicles (LEV). 136 At their core, these regulations involve a performance
standard, which is sufficiently stringent to make it very difficult to rely on
conventional technology as a compliance method. The LEV regulations, however,
generally permit each manufacturer to average its vehicles' emissions to meet the
standards. 137 This fleet-average approach represents a limited use of the trading
concept, since it does not allow credits38from non-vehicle emissions reductions to count
toward meeting the LEV obligation.
California has very recently adopted regulations directly limiting carbon emissions
from vehicles sold in that state. 139 And China has promulgated ambitious energy
efficiency requirements for vehicles.140 These standards, not the Kyoto mechanisms,

have fallen by fifty percent over the last fifteen years); Jeffrey Greenblatt, Samir Succar, David
C. Denkenberger, Robert H. Williams & Robert H. Socolow, BaseloadWind Energy: Modeling
the CompetitionBetween Gas Turbines and CompressedAirEnergy Storagefor Supplemental
Generation,35 ENERGY POL'Y 1474, 1474 (2007) (attributing a thirty percent annual increase in
installed wind capacity to a "twofold drop in capital costs between 1992 and 2001" and
"government initiatives").
133. 2004 Commission Energy Evaluation, supranote 110, at 20-21.
134. See Bernardo Barreto & Socrates Kypreos, Emissions Trading and Technology
Deployment in an Energy-Systems "Bottom-up "Model with Technology Learning, 158 EuR. J.
OPERATIONAL RES. 243,246-48 (2004) (estimating an eighty-six percent progress ratio for solar
photovoltaics, representing the rate of cost decline per doubling of production); Mona Hymel,
The United States'Experiencewith Energy-BasedTax Incentives: The EvidenceSupportingTax
Incentivesfor Renewable Energy 3-8 (Ariz. Legal Studies, Discussion Paper No. 06-21,2006),
http://www.ssm.com/abstract=896987 (discussing the United States' subsidies for fossil fuels
and renewable energy); Bert Metz & Detlef van Vuuren, How, and at What Costs, Can LowLevel Stabilization Be Achieved?-An Overview, in AVOIDING DANGEROUS CLIMATE CHANGE
339 (Hans Joachim Schellnhuber, Wolfgang Cramer, Nebojsa Nakicenovic, Tom Wigley &
Gary Yohe eds., 2006) (noting that renewable energy today represent one of the most expensive
options for greenhouse gas mitigation).
135. Plugging Into the Future, THE EcONOMIST, June 10, 2006, at 30 (discussing the fuel
efficiency gains of the Toyota Prius and other hybrid vehicles).
136. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 13, § 1960.1 (2006).

137. See Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass'n v. N.Y. State Dep't of Envtl. Conservation, 17 F.3d
521, 528 (2d Cir. 1994) (describing the fleet average approach), aff'd, 79 F.2d 1298 (2d Cir.
1996).
138. Keeth, supra note 101, at 726-27 (explaining how manufacturers can comply with
averaging requirements that relaxed the technological demands in the original program's zero
emission vehicle requirement).
139. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 13, § 1961.1(a)-(g) (2006).
140. Keith Bradsher & David Barboza, Pollutionfrom Chinese Coal Casts Shadow Around
Globe, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2006, at A I (noting that vehicles sold in China must meet stricter
fuel efficiency standards than those of the United States).
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seem the most likely drivers of meaningful technological change in the motor vehicle
industry.
Traditional regulations and demand-side management programs have increased
In the United States, for example, energy efficiency standards for
energy efficiency. 141
appliances have enormously decreased electricity use and associated carbon dioxide
42
emissions even as appliances have grown in size and their features have improved.
Demand-side management programs implemented by European governments and state
utility regulators in the United States require electric utilities to choose the most costeffective approach to matching supply and demand. 143 Demand-reducing investments
in energy efficiency generally cost less than supply-increasing investments in energy
production, so utility44 demand-side management programs have required investments in
energy efficiency.1
Thus, the data suggest that the Kyoto trading mechanisms have primarily
encouraged cheap end-of-the-pipe technologies, which do not significantly change
prevailing development patterns. 45 On the other hand, some targeted regulatory
programs have produced more fundamental technological changes. For a decision to
deploy solar power or another renewable energy source in lieu of burning coal changes
the fundamental choice about which fuel to use in producing energy. And energy
efficiency improvements reduce energy consumption, thereby reducing demand for
more energy production, the fundamental driver of climate change.
III.

ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND MARKET
LIBERALISM

Our entrepreneur in India and others like her have been choosing traditional end-ofthe-pipe technologies as the principal means of earning carbon credits. This result will
surprise many readers of the "instrument choice" literature. For that literature
generally associates "end-of-the-pipe" technology with high cost "command-andcontrol" regulation and links emissions trading to innovation and pollution
prevention. 146

141. David S. Loughran & Jonathan Kulick, Demand-Side Management and Energy
Efficiency in the UnitedStates, 25 ENERGYJ. 19,34 (2004) (noting that between 1989 and 1999,
utilities reported on average 180,000 MWh annual energy efficiency savings from demand-side
management).
142. Robert R. Nordhaus & Kyle W. Danish, Assessing the Options for Designing a
Mandatory U.S. Greenhouse Gas Reduction Program, 32 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 97, 107

(2005) (noting that the Department of Energy's appliance efficiency program has saved about
one-percent of total U.S. energy use).
143. See generally Ralph C. Cavanagh, Least-Cost Planning Imperatives for Electric
Utilitiesand TheirRegulators, 10 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 299,300-01 (1996) (justifying such a
comparison, explaining how to carry it out, and surveying state programs).
144. Loughran &Kulick, supra note 141, at 25 (showing that generating a kWh costs more
than twice as much as saving a kWh through energy efficiency).
145. Cf Choi, supranote 5,at 951 (arguing that "addressing global climate change requires
fundamental changes in human behavior").
146. Richard B. Stewart, ControllingEnvironmentalRisks Through EconomicIncentives, 13

COLUM. J.ENvmL. L. 153, 155, 166 (1988) (noting that technology-based regulation requires
installation of "pollution control" technology, while "economic incentives" encourage "new
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The failure to choose renewables suggests that minimizing short-term cost does not
maximize productive long-term technological change. This Part argues that positive
spillovers not captured by the actor making the change make technological innovation
very important to sustainable development, but that global emissions trading markets
do not adequately take spillovers into account. It then presents a theory explaining why
global trading has not encouraged renewable energy as well as more targeted
government programs. Finally, this Part draws lessons from emissions trading's
neglect of positive spillovers for the relationship between sustainable development and
market liberalism. It explains that environmental law must address an unacknowledged
tension between maximizing near-term efficiency and promoting sustainable
development.
A. Is Expensive Innovation Desirable?:Spillovers and SustainableDevelopment
Even if our entrepreneur would choose a cheap command-and-control technique
over a more innovative solar energy technology, we might not regard trading's
favoring of that choice as proof of a conflict between market liberalism and sustainable
development. If we employ soft versions of both market liberalism and sustainable
development, we can rationalize a comfortable marriage using the trading approach.
As already suggested, soft market liberalism accepts some role for government
regulation, especially when it uses economic incentives. A soft version of sustainable
development would demand nothing more than some actions addressing environmental
problems with significant future consequences. In that case, the choice to control HFC
combines cost effective market liberalism with sustainable development, since the
choice cost effectively realizes a real reduction in greenhouse gas emissions. On the
other hand, if we give greater weight to future generations' interests, we may find
sustainable development
and market liberalism in some tension, even in the emissions
47
trading realm. 1
1. Technological Innovation's Importance to Sustainable Development
Technological innovation is crucial to efforts to protect future generations'
interest.148 For this reason, both Agenda 21, an international agreement sometimes
described as sustainable development's blueprint, and the Brundtland Report

products or production technologies"); e.g., Richard B. Stewart, United States Environmental
Regulation: A FailingParadigm, 15 J.L. & COM. 585, 592 (1996) (contrasting the "existing
technology-based system['s]" emphasis on "end of pipe" controls with trading's encouragement
of "process changes and conservation").
147. CompareMichaelowa & Butzengeiger, supra note 87, at 3 (suggesting that renewables
policies might be justified without carbon benefits because of falling costs over time) with Jos
Sijm, The InteractionBetween the EUEmissions TradingScheme andNationalEnergy Policies,
5 CLIMATE POL'Y 79, 94 (2005) (suggesting that energy security, equity, "raising fiscal
resources," ancillary environmental benefits, and dynamic efficiency may justify energy policy,
but that allowance trading makes it unnecessary for carbon-reduction purposes).
148. DRIESEN, supra note 34, at 75-77; David M. Driesen, Design, Trading,andInnovation,
in MOVING TO MARKETS, supranote 53, at 437-38. While I frame much of my argument about
spillover neglect in terms of technological innovation, market-neglected positive spillovers can
arise from high quality non-innovative technology as well.
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emphasize the
needs for renewable energy, like the solar project our entrepreneur
49
considered.

This idea of a key role for technological innovation in sustainable development
focuses significant attention upon choices about "economic development" itself,which
includes fundamental choices about how to produce goods and services. The
economist Herman Daly has argued that sustainable development should aim to
reduce, or at least stabilize, "through-put"-the use of natural resources as inputs and
waste streams as output. 15 He opposes economic growth defined in terms of increased
through-put, because he fimds such growth unsustainable.' 5' He favors, however,
economic development, which he defines as improving living standards without
increasing through-put.15 2 This vision seems to require changes, such as increased use
of solar power, that enable us to produce goods and services without consuming nonrenewable fossil fuels and generating excessive waste. Making changes that allow for
economic development without
using up non-renewable resources requires significant
53
innovation.'
technological
We need not go as far as Daly would to find that protection of future generations in
the climate change context requires significant innovation in how the world produces
and uses energy. Indeed, climate change experts seem to agree that seriously
addressing climate change requires significant changes in energy production and
use. 14 Recently, several climate scientists have attempted to estimate the amount of
carbon dioxide reductions needed to avoid some of climate change's key dangers.
While estimates vary, they envision cuts on the order of fifty percent below global
1990 levels by the year 2050.155 Since the world's most populous countries, China and

149. U.N. Conference on Env't & Dev., Rio de Janerio, Brazil, June 3-14, 1992, Agenda 21,
9.9, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 151.26 (Aug. 12 1992) (calling for increased use of renewable energy
and energy efficiency); BRUNDTLAND REPORT, supranote 9, at 188 (stating that the development
of renewable energy be given the "highest priority").
150. Herman E. Daly, Sustainable Growth: An Impossibility Theorem, in VALUING THE
EARTH 271 (Herman E. Daly & Kenneth N. Townsend eds., 1992).
151. Id. at267-68.
152. Id. at268.
153. See DRIESEN, supranote 34, at 89 (explaining the link between Daly's idea of reduced
through-put and technological innovation).
154. Interview with Lewis Milford, Clean Air Group, Clean Energy Group (July 5, 2006)
(claiming that experts agree that the world needs significant innovation in how energy is
produced to adequately address climate change). See, e.g., DESSLER & PARSON, supra note 1,at
102-06 (discussing technological options to address climate change with emphasis on options
involving significant technological changes); Baumert, supra note 3, at 388 (stating that
effectively addressing climate change requires "large-scale technological and behavioral
changes").
155. See DESSLER & PARSON, supra note 1, at 155-58 (suggesting that avoiding a three
degrees Celsius temperature rise may require a forty percent cut from 2010 levels by 2050 and
more than a sixty percent cut by 2100); James E. Hansen, A Slippery Slope: How Much Global
Warming Constitutes "DangerousAnthropogenicInterference,"68

CLIMATE CHANGE269,

277

(2005) (stating that a two degrees Celsius temperature rise "almost surely takes us well into the
realm of dangerous" climate change); Malte Meinshausen, What Does a 2*C Target Mean for
Greenhouse Gas Concentrations?A BriefAnalysis Based on Multi-Gas Emissions Pathways
and Several Climate Sensitivity Uncertainty Estimates, in AVOIDING DANGEROUS CLIMATE
CHANGE,

supra note 134, at 269-70 (estimating that limiting temperature rise to less than two
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India, are currently building new coal-fired power plants to service their rapidly
industrializing countries, realizing such sizable
cuts will require dramatic changes in
56
how the world produces and uses energy.'
A moderate version of intergenerational sustainability might not countenance the
damage to future generations that a failure to produce this drastic reduction would
cause-for scientists associate a three degrees Celsius increase in global temperatures
15 7
(an increase well within the range scientists expect) with drastic consequences.
From the standpoint of sustainable development, a technological change that
contributes to a process of technological development leading, in the long term, to
significant fossil fuel displacement has much more value than deployment of a
conventional technology that contributes nothing to this long-term process.' 5 Cuttingedge technology offers more protection to future generations, even if both, in the shortterm, deliver equivalent direct greenhouse gas emissions reductions.
This implies that governments should choose strategies to meet Kyoto targets that
help make realization of more ambitious future targets feasible. Nobody believes that
Kyoto's contemplated five percent cut in developed countr' emissions meets the
Framework Convention's goal of avoiding dangerous climate change. The countries
ratifying the Kyoto Protocol saw the emissions strategies as a first step toward
seriously addressing this goal.15 9 Technological choices under the Kyoto Protocol
advance sustainable development when they contribute to making more ambitious
future goals feasible.
2. The Importance of Positive Spillover
The economic concept of a spillover helps explain innovation's value. When
somebody advances state-of-the-art technology, these advances often fuel positive
"spillovers"-benefits that do not generate rents for the original innovator, such as
contributions to further advances by competing firms.' Economists have long
recognized that firms and individuals underinvest in innovation for several reasons.
First, undertaking innovation often involves substantial expense with an uncertain
payoff. 61 Second, potential innovators tend to underinvest in technological change62
because the innovating firm cannot capture all of an innovation's positive benefits.'
degrees Celsius likely requires a fifty-five percent reduction below 1990 emissions levels by
2050).
156. Bradsher & Barboza, supra note 140 (explaining that Chinese coal-fired power plants
will probably increase greenhouse gas emissions by five times the amount of cuts from Kyoto
and that India is following suit).
157. James E. Hansen, Global Warming: Is There Still Time to Avoid DisastrousHumanMade Climate Change? i.e. Have We Passed a Tipping Point?, 26-29 (2006),

http://www.columbia.edu /-jehl/nas_24apri12006.pdf (providing maps of areas that would
probably be under water if temperature increased by three degrees Celsius).
158. See generally Choi, supra note 5, at 872 (claiming that development of renewable
energy and increased energy efficiency can move the world toward sustainable development).
159. KOLBERT, supra note 71, at 168.
160. Brett M. Frischman & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REv. 257,258-61
(2007).

161. PosNER, supra note 16, at 123 (commenting that uncertainty lies at the "core" of
technological innovation, because "[s]cientific progress is unpredictable ").
162. See id. at 123-24 (explaining that third parties' ability to use information makes it
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Patent law allows innovators to keep some of the rents from innovation in order to
address markets' failures to adequately stimulate innovation. 63 At the same time,
patent law (and intellectual property law generally) recognizes positive spillovers'
value and seeks to encourage realization of spillovers' benefits by allowing some open
access to information embedded in intellectual property. 164 In exchange for a patent
giving an innovator a monopoly in an invention's production, the patent law requires
publication of the patent, which discloses the invention's design details to
competitors.1 65 Publication facilitates other firms' efforts to build on the advances
justifying the patent. 166 Other intellectual property law features-limits on the term of
property rights, the lack of property rights in ideas and facts, and allowance for fair
use
1 67
of copyrighted material-also reflect recognition of positive spillovers' value.
Positive spillovers from technological choices in addressing climate change (or
other long-term environmental problems) play a vital role in advancing sustainable
development. For example, an advance in solar energy technology may stimulate other
advances that increase solar energy's utility (perhaps making it more effective in
cloudy climates) or lower its future costs. 168 Increasing the utility of renewable energy
makes it a more viable substitute for fossil fuels exacerbating global warming, thus
making an important long-term contribution to addressing global warming above and
beyond the carbon reduction associated with
a particular renewable energy project's
169
relatively direct carbon-reduction benefits.
Facilitation of long-term switches from fossil fuels to renewable energy not only
helps protect future generations from climate change's environmental and economic
harms but avoids more direct economic problems associated with fossil fuel use. Fossil
fuels cannot supply energy indefinitely and may prove very costly over time. Because
fossil fuel resources are finite, their price will eventually rise. 170 Current investment in
alternatives to fossil fuels reduces the cost of making these switches later with less

difficult for inventors to keep all the value their inventions create); Gregory N. Mandel,
PromotingEnvironmentalInnovation and Intellectual PropertyInnovation: A New Basis for
PatentRewards, 24 TEMPLE J. ENVTL. L. & TECH. 51, 56 (2006) (explaining that if a person
"builds a better mousetrap," others may copy it).

163. POSNER, supra note 16, at 283 (explaining that intellectual property law allows
innovators to capture some, but "not all," of innovation's value).
164. Id. at 282-93 (explaining that both copyright and patent law create a "semicommons"
combining private property rights and commons elements).
165. Id. at 291 (explaining that patent law "requires the patent owner to teach the public how
to make and use the invention").
166. Id. at 292.

167. See id. at 282-293 (explaining why these features and others promote positive
spillovers).
168. See generally, Steffen Kallbekken & Nathan Rive, Why Delaying Emissions Cuts is a

Gamble, in AvOIDING DANGEROUS CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 134, at 315 (explaining that
technological change can influence pollution abatement's cost and feasibility).
169. See Eban Goodstein, Prices Versus Policy: Which Path to Clean Technology, in THE
LONG-TERM ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE: BEYOND A DOUBLING OF GREENHOUSE GAS

CONCENTRATIONS 225 (Darwin C. Hall & Richard B. Howarth eds., 2001) (identifying early

investment in clean technology with avoidance of "ongoing residual damage from carbon
emissions").
170. Cf Choi, supra note 5, at 951 (claiming that recent crude oil prices indicate that "fossil
fuels have already begun to be in short supply").
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technological history,17 and also avoids potential supply shortages during a transition.
Switching before fossil fuels run out or become scarce reduces the economic damage
and environmental harms future generations will suffer.
In addition to these long-term positive spillovers, renewable energy generates nearterm positive spillovers. For example, selection of solar power as a method ofreducing
carbon will also reduce emissions of conventional air pollution. 172 These conventional
pollutants have made big contributions to many developing countries' failure to
provide a healthful life for their people, that is to meet the current generation's
needs.' 7 3 Thus, positive spillovers can serve sustainable development not only by
advancing future generations' interests but also by better meeting the current
generations' basic needs.
If our entrepreneur's solar energy project generates sufficiently valuable positive
spillovers, then our entrepreneur should invest in the solar option. 74 While a calculus
based only on least-cost carbon reductions directly associated with current projects
favors HFC 23, a broader consideration of positive spillovers and sustainable
development may favor the more expensive carbon abatement choice.
3. Valuable Innovation May Prove Initially Expensive
The adage, "You get what you pay for," suggests that technological choices
producing significant positive spillovers often will prove initially expensive. While our
entrepreneur's choice offers only one example of the tradeoff between near-term cost
effectiveness (narrowly defined) and realization of positive spillovers' benefits, this
tradeoff may be quite widespread. Solar energy constitutes a high quality
environmental product offering a significant array of advantages, not just a cheap fix
to a single problem. These advantages include avoidance of a variety of forms of
conventional air pollution, enhanced energy security, and avoidance of environmental
damages associated with extracting fossil fuels from the earth. However, this highquality product commands a price that reflects significant research and development
costs, which often are needed to develop major technological advances. Cars,
computers, and many other products stemmed from technological advances that
produced expensive luxury goods that ultimately became inexpensive enough to enjoy

171. See Goodstein, supra note 169, at 233 (explaining in detail why earlier investment in
clean technology reduces costs).
172. See Douglas A. Kysar, Some Realism About Environmental Skepticism: The
Implications of Bjorn Lomborg's The Skeptical Environmentalistfor EnvironmentalLaw and
Policy, 30 ECOLOGY L. Q. 223, 263 (2003) (noting incidental reductions in sulfur dioxide,
nitrogen oxides, volatile organic compounds, and particulates due to efforts to reduce climate
change); cf Luis Mundaca & Hakan Rodhe, CDM Wind-Energy Projects: Exploring Small
CapacityThresholds andLow Performances,4 CLIMATE POL'Y 399, 405 (2005) (describing how
wind energy reduces harmful sulfur dioxide emissions to zero).
173. Cf U.N. Conference on Env't & Dev., Rio de Janerio, Brazil, June 3-14, 1992, Rio
Declaration on Env't and Dev., princ. 1, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (Aug. 12, 1992)
(recognizing a human right to a healthy life based on the centrality of human beings to
sustainable development).
174. See Palmer & Burtraw, supra note 113, at 62 ("[p]roviding a jump start to technology
learning" can yield significant future benefits).
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a mass market.' 75 It is likely that a crucial innovation significant enough to make a
major difference for a serious, long-term environmental challenge like global
warming, while simultaneously addressing other environmental and developmental
needs, will prove initially expensive. Certainly, renewable energy seems to conform to
the model of an initially expensive good offering high quality.
However, high short-term costs do not necessarily imply high long-term costs.
Today's expensive technology can become tomorrow's cheap, routine way of offering
a better life. Economists studying innovation have noticed that firms learn from the
experience of manufacturing new products, and that this learning by doing can lower
costs and improve product quality over time in unpredictable ways.176 Learning seems
to have occurred in the case of renewable energy, even with rather modest use of it, for
renewable energy's price has generally fallen over time., 77 The tendency of firms to
learn from efforts to make products implies that choosing environmental instruments
that encourage initially expensive innovation can provide experience, thus lowering
long-term costs.
The solar example illustrates another feature of the tension between long-term and
near-term costs. Solar energy requires an expensive capital investment but no fuel
costs. This means that as time goes on, the total costs can become cheaper than that of
an approach like fossil fuel generation, which generates fuel costs year after year, costs
that will rise when fossil fuel becomes scarce. 1 78 Hence, expensive innovation may
have high value and low long-term costs, which should make it highly desirable from a
long-term perspective.

175. See LINDA NULL & JULIA LOBUR, THE ESSENTIALS OF COMPUTER ORGANIZATION AND
ARCHITECTURE 19-25 (2d ed. 2006) (explaining that the first supercomputer built with
transistors cost $10 million, but that integrated circuits and then microprocessors to miniaturize
transistors dropped the price and made personal computers possible); Rudi Volti, A Century of
Automobility, 37 TECH. & CULTURE 663, 667, 670 (1996) (describing cars' origins as luxury
goods and the assembly line's role in reducing prices); cf DAVID A. HOUNSHELL, FROM THE
AMERICAN SYSTEM TO MASS PRODUCTION, 1800-1932, 218, 241 (1984) (while Ford had

experience making luxury cars, he credits observation of other production processes as the
source of the idea of the assembly line to produce automobiles). See generallySabine Messner,
Endogenized TechnologicalLearningin an Energy Systems Model, 7 J. Evolutionary Econ. 291,

293 (1997) (describing "learning by doing" as "among the best empirically corroborated
phenomena characterizing technological change in industry.").
176. Barreto & Kypreos, supra note 134, at 245-46 ("learning ... plays an important role" in
improving technologies' cost and performance). See Patrick Matschoss & Heinz Welsch,
InternationalEmissions TradingandInduced Carbon-SavingTechnological Change:Effects of
Restricting the Trade in Carbon Rights, 33 ENVTL. & RESOURCE ECON. 169, 172 (2006)

(associating learning by doing with assuming that learning comes from production).
177. See CHRISTOPHER HARMON, EXPERIENCE CURVES OF PHOTOVOLTAIC TECHNOLOGIES 3
(2000), availableat http://www.iiasa.ac.at/Publications/Documents/IR-00-014.pdf(photovoltaic
modules experienced a 20% cost decline with each doubling of installed capacity on average);
Michaelowa & Butzengeiger, supra note 87, at 3 (most forms of renewable energy are
"undergoing a strong cost decrease"); Palmer & Burtraw, supra note 113, at 17, 51-52
(explaining that the potential for learning by doing is high for renewable energy).
178. Cf DRIESEN, supranote 34, at 83-85 (providing a numerical example to illustrate how
long-term and short-term costs may diverge).
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The neoliberal perspective tends to deny the value of initially expensive innovation
through the technique of discounting future benefits. 79 Because current technological
improvement's costs occur today and many of the benefits accrue far in the future,
reliance on discounting tends to produce analysis disapproving of significant near-term
80
efforts to protect future generations-like the employment of solar energy.'
Economists favor discounting because it reflects the observed preferences of market
participants, who tend to value current costs and benefits more highly than future costs
and benefits.' 8 ' But sustainable development proponents tend to treat this preference
for short-sightedness as a problem to be overcome, not something to institutionalize in
formal CBA.182 Hence, neoliberals and sustainable development advocates diverge, to
some degree, in how much value they attach to positive spillovers generating future
benefits.
B. Why GlobalEmissions TradingDoes Not Favor Valuable Innovation
Carbon markets encourage people like our entrepreneur to "internalize" some of the
value of carbon savings from environmental projects. In this, a carbon-trading program
resembles conventional performance standards and pollution taxes aimed at carbon,
both of which would also add a price to goods and services reflecting costs associated
with global warming. This Subpart focuses on the question of whether global carbon
markets tend to stimulate valuable innovations as a major means of realizing carbonreduction benefits.

179. See generally Kysar, supra note 172, at 266 (stating that economic models used to
estimate the costs and benefits of mitigating climate change "use a mathematical discount rate
... to significantly reduce" future harms' value); Richard L. Revesz, EnvironmentalRegulation,
Cost-Benefit Analysis, and the Discounting of Human Lives, 99 COLUM. L. REv. 941 (1999);
Kenneth Arrow, William R. Cline, Karl-G6ran Miler, Mohan Munasinghe, Rafael Squitieri &
Joeseph E. Stiglitz, IntertemporalEquity, Discounting,and EconomicEfficiency, in CLIMATE
CHANGE 1995, supra note 5, at 125.
180. POSNER, supranote 16, at 151-52 (recognizing that application of a discount rate tends
to "obliterate" future generations' interests in contexts like that of global warming because the
discounting drastically reduces valuation of future harms).
181. See John L. Donohue, Why We Should Discount The Views of Those Who Discount
Discounting, 108 YALE L. J. 1901, 1905 (1999) (a person would prefer saving ten lives today
over saving ten lives seven years from now).
182. See Douglas A. Kysar, Climate Change, CulturalTransformation,and Comprehensive
Rationality, 31 B. C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 555, 578-85 (2004) (discussing moral issues with
discounting in the climate change context); Kysar, supra note 8, at 2134 (noting that sustainable
development proponents do not accept existing preferences as immutable); Kysar, supra note
172, at 266-67 (questioning the "moral basis" for discounting human lives saved and other
future benefits of climate change policies). See generally David A. Dana, A Behavioral
Economic Defense of the PrecautionaryPrinciple,97 Nw. U. L. REv. 1315 (2003) (defending
the precautionary principle as a means of correcting for cognitive bias favoring short-term cost
avoidance over long-term risk avoidance); Daniel A. Farber & Paul A. Hemmersbaugh, The
Shadow of the Future:Discount Rates, Later Generations,and the Environment, 46 VAND. L.
REv. 267 (1993); LisaHeinzerling,DiscountingLife, 108 YALE L. J. 1911 (1999); Edith Brown
Weiss, The PlanetaryTrust ConservationandlntergenerationalEquity, 11 ECOLOGY L. Q. 495
(1984).
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I make a weak and a strong claim regarding global carbon markets and innovation.
The weak claim is simply that global carbon trading markets do not systematically
remedy the underinvestment in innovation that spillover analysis reveals. The strong
claim is that a global trading program stimulates valuable innovation more weakly
than a performance standard of identical stringency. These claims imply that
environmental law must address a tradeoff between near-term efficiency and long-term
sustainability.
1. The Failure of Global Emissions Trading to Remedy Spillover Neglect
Rational actors in the carbon markets will take direct carbon benefits into account
as they choose projects, but they will not necessarily take into account projects'
positive spillovers. And these spillovers will vary. For example, the HFC project
seems to offer no long-term technological development prospects (owing to the phaseout of the production process to which it is attached) and no collateral environmental
benefits. Still, our Indian entrepreneur may not choose the solar project because she
receives no economic benefit from competitors building upon lessons learned from her
solar installation or from lowered conventional pollution associated with her choice.
This failure of global trading markets to encourage rational actors to take positive
spillovers into account means, at a minimum, that emissions trading provides no
panacea for the problem of insufficient investment in environmental innovation.
By contrast, targeted renewable energy programs have a specific goal of stimulating
sufficient investment in renewables. By either requiring deployment of renewable
energy or offering a high tariff for it, they pay for long-term economic development.
Indeed, they do this precisely because of recognition of some of the broader noncarbon benefits of renewables, such as: long-term technological development,
heightened energy security, and reductions in conventional pollution.183 Thus,
spillovers-benefits not internalized in carbon markets-become rationales for
expenditures in targeted energy programs that aid sustainable development. This
suggests that targeted programs aimed at producing positive spillovers may provide
better incentives for valuable innovation than global trading programs.
2. Global Trading Programs Provide Weaker Incentives for Valuable Innovation
than Performance Standards of Identical Stringency
Indeed, for any given level of stringency, a global emissions trading program offers
a weaker incentive for valuable innovation than a performance standard of identical
stringency. Emissions trading proponents have claimed that trading provides stronger
incentives for innovation than traditional regulation.' 8 4 , confine my contrary claim of
183. Marc Ringel, Fosteringthe Use of Renewable Energies in the European Union: The
Race Between Feed-in Tariffs and Green Certificates,31 RENEWABLE ENERGY 1, 4-5 (2006)
(discussing these factors as aims of EU policy on renewables).
184. See, e.g., Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming EnvironmentalLaw:
The DemocraticCaseforMarketIncentives, 13 COLUM. J. ENvTL. L. 171, 183 (1988); Robert
W. Hahn and Robert N. Stavins, Incentive-BasedEnvironmentalRegulation:A New Era From
an Old Idea?, 18 ECOLOGY L. Q. 1, 13 (1991); Robert N. Stavins, Policy Instruments for
ClimateChange: How Can NationalGovernments Address a Global Problem?, 1997 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 293, 302-03 (1997); Stewart, supra note 146, at 160; Stewart, supra note 17, at 19
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the inferiority of global trading to relatively expensive innovation. Furthermore, I do
not argue that trading is incapable of stimulating expensive innovation if the trading is
sufficiently stringent. I only argue that for any given level of stringency, that is a given
carbon-reduction target, a performance standard creates better incentives for valuable
innovation than a trading program. Holding the level of stringency constant allows for
the exploration of the fundamental attributes of emissions trading, by eliminating
variables other than instrument choice. My claim implies that global emissions trading
generally loses important positive spillovers.
The conventional claim that trading encourages innovation better than traditional
regulation generally relies upon the observation that emissions trading, unlike
traditional regulation, encourages polluters to go beyond compliance.' 85 This suggests
that an emissions trading program would provide a better incentive for innovation than
a traditional regulation implementing the same underlying emissions limit.
This analysis, however, focuses on credit sellers alone and ignores buyers.' 86 Credit
buyers face weaker incentives to innovate under a trading program than they would
face under a performance standard of identical stringency that does not allow for
trades. 187 Those who buy credits would do so because they face relatively high control
costs. Trading allows buyers to escape from implementing expensive control measures
at their own facilities. Without trading, however, they would face significant
incentives to innovate, as innovation would provide the only way of escaping a
conventional approach's high control costs. Thus, trading provides inferior innovation
incentives for owners of half of the sources in a perfect trading market.
Precise analysis of trading's impact on innovation requires us to ask the following
question: "Does trading shifting emissions reductions from high cost to low-cost
facilities provides better net incentives for innovation than those an identical
performance standard would provide if regulators allowed no trading?' ' 188 A growing
number of economists have questioned the claim that emissions trading always
provides superior incentives for nnovation. And a recent detailed empirical analysis
(stating that "economic incentive systems," including emissions trading, have an advantage over
command and control regulation in stimulating "continuing innovation").
185. Adam B. Jaffe, Richard G. Newell & Robert N. Stavins, EnvironmentalPolicy and

Technological Change, 22 ENVTL. & RESOURCE ECON. 41, 51 (2002) (economic incentives

stimulate innovation by paying finns to "clean up a bit more"); David A. Malueg, Emissions
Credit Trading and the Incentive to Adopt New PollutionAbatement Technology, 16 J.ENVTL.
ECON. & MGMT. 52, 53-54 (1987).

186. Driesen, supra note 148, at 434-35 (explaining how the traditional focus on sellers
biases theory).

187. Barreto & Kypreos, supra note 134, at 259 (finding that trading hinders the
development and deployment of low carbon technology in permit buying regions).
188. Driesen, supra note 148, at 433-34 (presenting and defending this analytical
framework); Schwarze, supra note 108, at 56-57 (recognizing that a "fair comparison" between
trading and traditional regulation requires the same standard).
189. See, e.g., Joel F. Bruneau, A Note on Permits,Standards,andTechnologicalInnovation,

48 J.ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 1192 (2004); W. A. Magat, Pollution Controland Technological
Advance: A Dynamic Model of the Firm,5 J.ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 1 (1978); Malueg, supra
note 185; Juan-Pablo Montero, Market Structureand EnvironmentalInnovation, 5 J.APPLIED
ECON. 293 (2002) (trading, taxes, or traditional regulation can best encourage research and
development when firms' products are strategic substitutes); Juan-Pablo Montero, Permits,
Standards, and TechnologicalInnovation, 44 J.ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 23 (2002); see also
David M. Driesen, Does Emissions TradingEncourageInnovation?,33 ENVTL. L. REP. 10094
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of sulfur dioxide controls in the utility industry argues that more innovation occurred
under the command-and-control regime in place prior to 1990 than under the more
recent acid rain trading program. 190 The acid rain program, the poster child of
emissions trading, generally encouraged inexpensive but traditional compliance
strategies, namely use of scrubbers and low sulfur coal.191
Since most economists tend to focus on efficiency, rather than sustainable
development, they generally discuss innovation under the rubric of "dynamic
efficiency." ' 92 This term refers to the capacity of a program to lower costs through
innovation to maximize net benefits to the current generation.' 93 Economists do not
usually focus on a program's capacity to induce high-cost innovation for the benefit of
future generations.
Emissions trading provides inferior incentives for relatively expensive innovation
because emissions trading lowers the cost of routine compliance.' 94 This means that
trading lowers the price point where innovation becomes cost effective. To see this
imagine two pollution source owners. One of these polluters, who we'll call Buyer, has
marginal control costs of $1000 per ton of carbon reduction. The other, who we'll call
Seller, has marginal control costs of $500 per ton. If we require each of these sources
to meet a carbon reduction target of 100 tons, a performance standard approach, then
Buyer will acquire an incentive to seek out innovations costing less than $1000 per
ton. However, if we allow trading, Buyer will be able to purchase 100 extra $500 per
ton reductions from Seller instead of achieving compliance locally. Under this
scenario, only innovations costing less than $500 per ton begin to penetrate the
industry.195 Hence, trading eliminates incentives for relatively costly innovations that
would be economic in a non-trading program of comparable stringency.
(2003) (arguing that trading may encourage less innovation than a comparable performance
standard, but suggesting that it may change the type of innovation); David M. Driesen, The
Economic Dynamics of EnvironmentalLaw: Cost-Benefit Analysis, Emissions Trading, and
PrioritySetting, 31 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 501,519-20 (2004) (stating that trading may have

an overall negative effect on innovation).
190. Margaret R. Taylor, Edward S. Rubin & David A. Hounshell, Regulationas the Mother
ofInvention: The CaseofSO 2 Control,27 L. & POL'Y 348,370 (2005) (concluding that trading

encouraged less innovation than command and control).
191. Choi, supranote 5,at 887 (stating that the acid rain program has encouraged reliance on
low-sulfur coal and scrubber installation); Swift, supranote 60, at 10332 (describing scrubbing
and low-sulfur coals as the principle compliance means, but finding innovation in blending
techniques and scrubber design); Taylor et al., supra note 190, at 356 (discussing reliance on
wet scrubbers and low-sulfur coals); see David Popp, Pollution ControlInnovations and the
CleanAir Act of 1990,22 J. POL'y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 641 (2003) (finding more patenting of

scrubber technology under command and control than under the acid rain trading program, but
finding a shift in the type of innovation encouraged under trading).
192. DRIESEN, supra note 34, at 71.
193. Id.

194. See Driesen, supra note 52, at 336 (noting that spatial flexibility makes it easier "to
deploy a well understood control method").
195. In reality, marginal control costs usually rise as a facility increases reductions. Thus,
this example is oversimplified. But this simplification does not influence the results. Even ifthe
low cost facility incurs higher costs for the reductions sold to Buyer than for the reductions
made to merely achieve compliance, these extra reductions must still cost substantially less than
the cost of routine compliance at Buyer's firm to make trading worthwhile.
Indeed, the example in some ways understates the depth of the weakness of global trading in
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Trading proponents point out that vast differences in marginal control costs are
common. This is the reason that trading generates substantial costs savings. This
means that trading should lower the marginal control costs for an industry
substantially, thereby significantly reducing incentives for relatively expensive
innovation.
The observation that reducing the cost of routine compliance should reduce
incentives for valuable innovation is consistent with a hypothesis economists
commonly employ in analyzing innovation: the induced innovation hypothesis. This
hypothesis assumes that rational actors innovate when adhering to routine becomes too
costly.196 That assumption would suggest that lowering routine compliance costs
through trading would reduce, not augment, incentives for relatively expensive
innovation.
Our entrepreneur's choice can illustrate the reasons that trading causes market
actors to tend to favor cheap, routine measures over valuable innovation. As she
decides whether to employ solar energy or an end-of-the-pipe control, she probably
thinks about her potential customer-the German electric utility owner. The rational
actor model would predict that this customer will only want to pay for credits costing
less than his utility's marginal control cost. Hence, if a solar installation costs more
than the marginal cost of local control in Germany, our entrepreneur cannot hope to
recoup her investment if she invests in solar energy. Renewable energy often costs a
energy technology may reflect significant research
lot and innovative new renewable
197
and development costs.
Even if local conditions in sunny India are so propitious for solar energy that our
entrepreneur can generate carbon credits costing less than the German utility's local
costs,' 98 she may think twice before investing in a novel solar energy technology.
When she sells her credits, she may have to compete with other entrepreneurs for the
sale. This competition may induce her to choose the cheapest option, even if both
options cost less than the German utility's marginal cost. 199 In other words,
competition may pressure our entrepreneur to choose the end-of-the-pipe approach.
Market reports do claim that HFC reduction costs much less than renewable power, so

stimulating expensive innovation. One would expect trading to lower the marginal control costs
of a large group of buyers, which might constitute about half of the participants in a trading
program. And it would systematically lower the costs, and hence the price points innovators
must meet, to the level of the cheapest reductions available anywhere within the universe of
sources eligible to generate credits. In a global market, that universe is likely to be large and the
opportunities for cheap routine reductions enormous.
196. Cf Matschoss & Welsch, supra note 176, at 173 (referring to this hypothesis as the
assumption of "induced factor-saving technological change").
197. See Paolo Bertoldi, Silvia Rezessy, Ole Langniss & Monique Voogt, White, Green &
Brown Certificates:How to Make the Most of Them at 11 (2005), http://sunbird.jrc.it/energy

efficiency/pdf/publications/ECEEE%202005%20paper/o207%20203 %20fmal.pdf(stating that
the ETS will probably do little to encourage renewable energy because "renewables may have
higher marginal abatement costs" than other carbon mitigation options).
198. See DESSLER & PARSON, supranote 1,at 103 (pointing out that solar power is "already
cost competitive in some niche applications").
199. See Fenhann CDM Pipeline, supra note 124 (buyers and investors favor projects
requiring the least investment).
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the available 0 data supports the theory that trading disfavors relatively expensive
20
innovation.

This analysis helps explain why targeted regulatory programs encourage renewable
energy development better than global emissions trading programs. The Kyoto
Protocol contemplates a five percent drop in developed countries' emissions.
Achieving this target through a global trading program should encourage a whole
series of projects like the HFC project, which cost much less than renewable energy
projects. However, if the world creates a renewable portfolio standard demanding that
new renewable energy deployment create a five percent drop in carbon emissions, thus
limiting the range of reduction options, this will create more valuable innovationinnovation with significant positive spillovers. Hence, recognition of the tension
between global cost effectiveness and targeted innovation efforts can help explain why
the data presented should not be surprising.
However, some project developers acting in the global carbon markets have chosen
to develop renewable energy projects, albeit on a relatively small scale. 20 ' The
existence of these projects suggests that market actors may not fully conform to the
rational actor model, which assumes that actors maximize their profits by seeking low
cost projects. 2° 2 Some credit purchasers may wish to enhance their reputations by

purchasing credits reflecting renewable energy projects.20 3 Indeed, sustainable
development advocates have developed a "gold standard" for CDM projects that gives
projects advancing sustainable development an environmentalist seal of approval. 20 4
This approach suggests that these advocates see market decisions as susceptible
to
20 5
social and political influences, not only to profit maximizing behavior.

200. See Ellis & Kamel, supra note 126, at 13-15 (stating that renewable energy projects
typically have relatively high abatement costs and industrial gas projects have low costs);
Michaelowa &Butzengeiger, supranote 87, at 3 (predicting that the "EU emissions trading will
not induce development of technologies that currently have high.. . costs," such as renewable
energy, because of low allowance prices). See generally CAPOOR &AMBROSI, supra note 7, at 9
(discussing the lack of an internationally recognized price index and the tendency to keep prices
and contract structures confidential).
201. See Ellis & Butzengeigersupra note 126, at 13.
202. See White, supranote 20, at 65 (noting that firms make decisions to maximize profits).
It is also possible that in some locations renewable energy proves extremely cost effective.
203. See Pearson,supra note 126, at 15 (suggesting that "some buyers" will pay a premium
for renewables credits for public relations reasons).
204. The Gold Standard, http://www.cdmgoldstandard.org/ (webpage of "gold standard"
certifying organization).
205. Douglas Kysar, Preferencesfor Processes: The Process/ProductDistinction and the

Regulation of Consumer Choice, 118 HARV. L. REv. 525, 529 (2004) (explaining that
information about how goods are produced can influence consumer choice); Kysar, supranote
8, at 2156 (identifying "infusing public policy elements into markets" as an important
phenomenon that has attracted little attention); see lain MacGill, Hugh Outhred & Karel Nolles,
Some Design Lessons from Market-Based Greenhouse Gas Regulation in the Restructured
AustralianElectricity Industry, 34 ENERGY POL'Y 11, 17 (2006) (demonstrating that markets

have discounted credits for renewable energy produced by burning native forest waste in
response to NGO opposition); The Gold Standard, supra note 204 (describing the NGO's
strategy of persuading stakeholders that gold standard credits offer greater value and less risk
than credits reflecting projects that NGOs have not specifically endorsed).
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I do not claim that a categorical rule prohibits trading from stimulating renewable
energy. Indeed, as governments impose more stringent caps on sources raising their
control costs, the ability of renewable energy projects to play some role should
increase. The data in this paper generally represent a very early picture of the trading
market's response to the EU's phase one emissions limits and the inchoate possibility
of stricter limits in phase two. The insight at the core of my claim, however, that
lowering cost does not increase incentives for valuable innovation, is fully consistent
with standard economic models that show a correlation between technological
incentives and permit prices. 20 6 Nor do I claim that traditional regulation does a
wonderful job of stimulating innovation, although it sometimes has done so when
sufficiently stringent.20 7 1 make only the narrow claim that a performance standard
encourages greater use of valuable innovation than a trading program of identical
stringency. This claim suggests a tradeoff between short-term cost effectiveness and
investment in long-term environmental and economic development.2 8

206. See, e.g., Pedro Linares, Francisco Javier Santos, Mariano Ventosa & Luis Lapiedra,
Impacts of the EuropeanEmissions TradingScheme Directive andPermitAssignment Methods
on the Spanish Electricity Sector, 27 ENERGY J. 79, 88, 91 (2006) (forecasting switches to
natural gas combined cycles but no other "new" technology, because "the permit price is not
high enough").
207. Nicholas A. Ashford & George R. Heaton, Jr., Regulation and Technological
Innovation in the Chemical Industry, 46 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 109, 139-140 (1983);
Schwarze, supra note 108, at 57-58 (stating that demanding traditional regulation produces
strong incentives for innovation); see DRIESEN, supra note 34, at 52-53 (discussing cases where
traditional regulation has encouraged innovation); OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S.
CONGRESS, GAUGING CONTROL TECHNOLOGY AND REGULATORY IMPACTS IN OCCUPATIONAL

SAFETY AND HEALTH: AN APPRAISAL OF OSHA's ANALYTICAL APPROACH, 89-90 (1995);

Nicholas A. Ashford, Christine Ayers & Robert F. Stone, Using Regulation to Change the
Market for Innovation, 9 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 419, 440-41 (1985); Kurt Strasser, Cleaner
Technology, Pollution Prevention andEnvironmentalRegulation, 9 FORDHAM ENvTL. L. REv.
1,28-32 (1997).
208. The failure of emissions trading to stimulate projects that increase energy efficiency
stems from the peculiarities of the Kyoto trading design rather than a general failure of trading
to encourage cost effectiveness. See Bertoldi et al., supra note 197, at 11 (pointing out that enduse energy efficiency provides "low-cost" carbon reduction.) The Kyoto parties' decision to
allow trades with sources whose emissions remain uncapped threatens the program's integrity
because it creates a potential to give up reductions from regulated sources in exchange for
positive changes that would happen even without a trading program. See Sandra Greiner & Axel
Michaelowa, Defining Investment Additionalityfor CDMProjects-Practical
Approaches, 31
ENERGY POL'Y 1007, 1007 (2003) (linking the lack of targets for reductions in developing
countries to potential problems with CDM's integrity). In order to avoid this danger, the Kyoto
Protocol requires that credit only be granted for projects yielding "additional" emission
reductions. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 2, art. 12(5)(c); Framework Convention on Climate
Change: Conference of the Parties, October 19-November 10, 2001, Marrakesh Accords, Annex
17/CP.7 43. U.N. Doc FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.1 (Jan. 21, 2002); see KYOTO MECHANISMS,
supranote 90, at 193 (explaining that certification of credits for energy efficiency projects that
would have been used anyway would lead to increased emissions). Because many energy
efficiency projects are economically attractive on their own, they have difficulty satisfying this
criterion. See KYOTO MECHANISMS, supra note 90, at 193 (using introduction of "improved
energy efficiency technologies that would have become widely used" anyway as the example of
an additionality problem); K. Umamaheswaran & Axel Michaelowa, Additionality and
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C Implicationsfor SustainableDevelopment andMarket Liberalism

Recognizing the value of positive spillovers exposes the tension between the shortterm cost effectiveness markets favor and long-term economic and environmental
progress. This tension has implications for the conceptual relationship between
sustainable development and market liberalism as they concern environmental policy
and institutional design. I address each in turn.
1. On Sustainable Development's Relationship to Market Liberalism
If we employ a weak sustainability concept, then any use of technology that
addresses climate change advances sustainable development and the cost effective
HFC solution is fine. If we employ even a moderately strong version of the concept,
however, a rift opens between the partners to Kyoto's conceptual shotgun wedding.
Initially expensive technological innovation has a vital role to play in sustainable
development by facilitating the protection of future generations from shortages of
finite resources and serious climate change risks. Market liberalism has defects in
encouraging future economic welfare and environmental protection because it fails to
correct private actors' unwillingness to pay for important positive spillovers.2 °9

SustainableDevelopmentIssues Regarding CDMProjectsin Energy Efficiency Sector,HWWA

Discussion Paper 346, 2, http://www.hwwa.de (characterizing additionality analysis of energy
efficiency projects as "cursory"). The Kyoto Protocol's language suggests a "project
additionality test"-that the project produce real additional reductions-but the regime has
included to some degree a "financial additionality test" that requires that the credit purchases are
essential to making the project happen. See Michael Dutschke & Axel Michaelowa,
Development Assistance and CDM - How to Interpret 'FinancialAdditionality,' 11 ENVT. &
DEv. ECON. 235 (2006) (discussing an interpretive issue with regard to financial additionality's
relationship to foreign aid); Fenhann CDM Pipeline, supranote 124, at 22-23 (quoting an EU
program elaborating additionality testing as acknowledging a general recognition that only
projects that would not have taken place without the purchase of credits meet additionality
criteria); Umamaheswaran &Michaelowa, supra,at 22 (noting that the CDM Executive Board
has required evidence that CDM revenue was considered at the design stage for "prompt start
projects"). A design that only allowed trades with sources subject to caps might well encourage
energy efficiency. See Robert N. Stavins, Implicationsof the US Experience With Market-Based
EnvironmentalStrategiesfor FutureClimate Policy, in EMissioNs TRADING, supra note 55, at

66-67 (recognizing that programs allowing "an unregulated source" to generate credits require
review lest credits be given for reductions "that would have taken place in any event").
209. Our entrepreneur may consider the value of receiving a longer stream of direct carbon
benefits from the solar project than the HFC project would generate. She may sharply discount
the value of future carbon reductions even though their value to future generations might be
nearly as high as the early reductions. The parties to Kyoto have not yet agreed to targets beyond
2012, which lessens incentives to think about long-term streams of reductions. Even if she
considers long-term benefits that she can realize profits from, there remains no reason for her to
consider spillovers like the value of her technological contribution to other suppliers' future
development of solar energy.
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2. Lessons for Environmental Law
A moderately strong version of sustainability requires that environmental policy
address the tradeoff between short-term cost effectiveness and long-term sustainable
development. 2'0 The existence of a tradeoff between near-term cost effectiveness and
long-term technological development does not dictate abandonment of global trading,
but it does suggest that an assumption that liberal trading serves as a panacea for
failures to innovate has212little justification. 21 1 This tradeoff generates three lessons for
environmental policy.
First, policy-makers must consciously seek to encourage innovation, especially
expensive innovation, and not assume that it will come about from just any marketbased approach.213 This lesson is important for climate change policy because sectoral
programs aimed at stimulating technological innovation can clash, in some respects,
with global trading. The danger exists that policy-makers may weaken or even
eliminate successful innovation stimulating programs to address those tensions.
Making innovation a goal implies respecting the value of a mixture of policy
tools,
214
including some that favor technological innovation over cost effectiveness.
Second, policy-makers and scholars should more creatively explore the use of
economic incentives and traditional regulation to encourage innovation.2 15 For
example, consider the idea of an Environmental Competition Statute. 21 6 Instead of
relying on government standard setting (as in emissions trading) or taxation, such a
statute would authorize any company making a pollution reduction to recoup its cost
plus a pre-set premium from competitors with higher emissions. 1 7 Such a system
would encourage firms to compete to maximize environmental quality, rather than to

210. See DESSLER & PARSON, supra note 1, at 170-71 (explaining that emissions trading
exploits "cheap opportunities" to deploy "presently available" technology, but it undermines the
incentives to develop the new technologies that may reduce long-term costs); PALMER &
BURTRAW, supra note 113, at 59 (explaining that the most cost effective way to encourage
renewable energy employs a carbon trading design that is more costly than a standard design);
Schwarze, supranote 108, at 53 (recognizing "a general tradeoffbetween the goal ofstimulating
new technology and the goal of dynamic efficiency").
211. Stavins, supra note 208, at 71-72 (stating that "little is known empirically about the
impact of these instruments on technological change" and that "there is... no policy panacea').
212. Additional approaches to possible innovation exist. See DRIESEN, supra note 34, at 15161, 183-201; David M. Driesen, Sustainable Development and Air Quality: The Need to
Replace Basic Technologies with CleanerAlternatives, 32 ENVTL. L. REP. 10277, 10285-90
(2002) (discussing various alternatives).
213. See Richard B. Stewart, Regulation, Innovation,andAdministrativeLaw:A Conceptual
Framework,69 CAL. L. REv. 1256, 1260-61 (1981) (concluding that innovation is needed just
to keep environmental problems from getting worse as economic growth continues).
214. Choi, supra note 5, at 934 n.308 (calling renewable portfolio standards "[t]he most
effective policy tool" for increasing renewable energy's market share).
215. See, e.g., Mandel, supra note 162, at 64-69 (proposing a "patent rewards system" for
environmental technology).
216. See DRIESEN, supranote 34, at 151-161.
217. See id. at 151-54 (explaining that both emissions trading and pollution taxes depend
upon government decisions to drive pollution reduction and suggesting mandatory payments to
less polluting competitors as an alternative).
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respond only to the limited incentives sometimes timid government officials create by
regulatory or taxation decisions. 218
Third, concern for innovation should play a major role in the design, not just the
selection, of instruments, for innovation depends not just on the selection of regulatory
instruments, but also on rather technical design considerations. 219 The LEV program
provides an example of one aspect of design, showing that a narrow trading market
may better stimulate costly advances in the state-of-the-art than global trading
programs.
By limiting averaging to vehicle fleets, instead of fully embracing a global free
market model, California regulators limited trading's capacity to undermine innovation
necessary to meet stringent performance standards. 22 Auto-makers could surely avoid
the high costs of making hybrid vehicles if they could make up the emissions
reductions by purchasing cheap credits from any source of relevant emissions in the
world. 221 The restriction of trading, however, makes it harder to rely on cheap routine
solutions. 222 Design plays a critical role in the
capacity of both traditional and "market223
based" regulation to stimulate innovation.

218. See id. at 154 (explaining that the Environmental Competition Statute relies on
polluters' hopes of besting competitors and fears of losing out to them to motivate reductions).
219. EMISSIONS TRADING AND BUSINESS 46-49 (Ralf Antes, Bemd Hansjtirgens & Peter
Letmathe eds., 2006) (discussing the effects of auctioning allowances, providing free allowances
to new entrants, and preserving allowances for owners of closed plants on innovation); Jody
Freeman & Daniel A. Farber, ModularEnvironmentalRegulation, 54 DUKE L.J. 795,836 (2005)
(characterizing "careful attention to design" as "crucial"); see MacGill et al., supranote 205, at
23 (explaining that absent appropriate design, poor quality credits can crowd out high quality
credits); see, e.g., PALMER & BURTRAW, supra note 113, at 25 (advocating the allocation of

carbon allowances based on output, which favors renewable energy providers with the
opportunity to sell all of their allowances); Atle Midttun & Kristian Gautesen, Feed in or
Certificates, Competition or Complementarity? Combining a Static Efficiency and a Dynamic
InnovationPerspective on the Greening of the Energy Industry, 35 ENERGY POL'Y 1419, 1420
(2007) (green certificate systems "with free competition between all renewable technologies"
will not support "the broader technological development necessary to further subsequent
generations of renewable technology").
220. See James MacKintosh, The Car Industry Needs Carbon Trading, FIN. TIMES, July 3,
2006, at 17 (suggesting that a broader trading scheme would allow car manufacturers to avoid

manufacturing hybrid vehicles and vehicles using biofuels).
221.

See CALIFORNIA ENvIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY AIR RESOURCES BOARD, STAFF

REPORT: INITIAL STATEMENT OF REASONS FOR PROPOSED RULEMAKING, PUBLIC HEARING TO
CONSIDER ADOPTION OF REGULATIONS TO CONTROL GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS FROM MOTOR

VEHICLES vii (2004) (prohibiting use of credits from non-vehicle measures or for measures
outside ofCalifomia to avoid diluting carbon reduction regulations' technology-forcing effect).
222. See Choi, supra note 5, at 937 (recommending a cap on credits from foreign countries to
address "deterrence of long-term technological improvements"); Matschoss & Welsch, supra
note 176, at 170 (noting that a number of writers have argued that placing limits on trades
increases incentives for technological innovation).
223. DRIESEN, supra note 34, at 183-201 (explaining principles of regulatory design and
making illustrative reform recommendations); Michael Grubb, Carlo Carraro & John
Schellnhuber, TechnologicalChangefor Atmospheric Stabilization:Introductory Overview to
the Innovation Modeling Comparison Project, 27 ENERGY J. 1, 14 (2006) (highlighting the need
for clear signals through long-term targets and characterizing the policy implications of
considering innovation as "far more subtle" than questions of choosing between trading and
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While principles that make innovation a goal-more creative exploration of
mechanisms and conscious design for innovation-may seem obvious once stated,
scholars and regulators frequently overlook them. This design principle merits further
treatment here, for government's role in design provides a link between the trading
case and broader institutional issues about the proper roles of governments and
markets.
Selection of regulatory targets constitutes one of the most important design
considerations for an emissions trading or traditional regulatory program.2 24 An
emissions trading scheme depends for its efficacy on standard government decisions
about regulatory stringency, that is, the amount of reductions to require. 25 Some have
criticized EU members for allocating too many allowances to industrial sources during
the EU Trading Scheme's first phase. 226 By setting a cap near, or in some cases, above
then current emissions levels, the EU arguably lost an opportunity to make significant
227
carbon reductions in phase one and to provide some incentives for innovation.
Conversely, if governments set ambitious caps for emissions trading schemes, these
can greatly increase pressure for significant technological changes. This relationship
between regulatory stringency and incentives for technological advancement is not
unique to emissions trading.22 s Government decisions that determine the stringency of
performance standards or 229
the amount of pollution taxes also influence the magnitude
of incentives to innovate.
But proponents of "innovative market-based mechanisms" sometimes suggest that
emissions trading automatically reduces emissions, thereby obscuring the importance
230
of collective political decision-making in setting caps.
One can address trading's weakness in stimulating innovation by increasing the
stringency of the cap. A trading program that reduces pollution by X tons encourages
traditional regulation). The acid rain program sought to encourage renewable energy by setting
aside allowances for renewable energy. 42 U.S.C. § 765 lc(f)-(g) (2007). But this feature had
little effect. See Choi, supra note 5, at 891 n.86. We need more research about designing trading
programs to encourage innovation. Cf id.at 936-37 (opining that "[d]irect allocations of
allowances to renewable energy sources would function as a much more powerful tool for
accelerating the commercial development of renewable energy technologies").
224. Michael Grubb, Christian Azar & U. Martin Persson, Allowance Allocation in the
European Emissions Trading Scheme: A Commentary, 5 CLIMATE POL'Y 127, 127 (2005)
(describing the "allocation of allowances" as "the most ...important step" for "any emissions
trading system").
225. Id. (allowance allocation determines the total emissions reductions and the magnitude of
incentives for change); see, e.g., Choi, supra note 5, at 902-03 (describing California's
RECLAIM program as a "failure" because the South Coast Air Quality Management District set
the cap too high).
226. See Grubb et al., supra note 224.
227. See id. at 131-32 (finding the allocations in phase one inconsistent with a serious effort
to meet Kyoto targets and unlikely to encourage innovation); Gaming Gases; Emissions
Trading, THE EcoNoMiST, June 10, 2006, at 69 (because of overallocation of allowances and
other design features the EU Emissions Trading Scheme "failed to boost alternatives").
228. See PALMER & BURTRAW, supra note 113, at 31 (explaining that the stringency of a
renewable portfolio standard affects the prospects of different classes of renewable energy).
229. DRIESEN, supranote 34, at 197 (explaining the link between stringency and innovation).
230. See, e.g., EMISSIONs TRADING, supra note 55, at 4 (describing "cap-and-trade systems"
as representing "a transition to market-based instruments which rely totally on market forces to
create the necessary ...incentives").
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expensive innovation less well than a program of performance standards providing for
X tons of reduction. But if one establishes an innovation premium in the cap, call it I,
such that the cap requires X + I tons of reduction, then innovation performance would
improve. In order for a trading program achieving a reduction of X + I to match the
innovation performance (with respect to high cost innovation) of a performance
standard requiring X tons of reduction, X + I must raise marginal control costs so that
they equal the marginal control costs of achieving X through performance standards.
Since trading significantly lowers marginal control costs, the innovation premium
necessary to meet this condition would be quite high.
In principle, the choice to use emissions trading should make it easier to set more
stringent caps than regulators would set for a traditional regulation.23' Since emissions
trading lowers compliance costs, government officials making cost-sensitive decisions
should feel more comfortable setting ambitious goals when it uses trading than when it
employs a traditional performance standard. Market liberalism in the selection of
regulatory means may contribute to governments' willingness to establish regulatory
goals compatible with sustainable development.
Yet, it would be a mistake to assume, without further research, that an inexorable
political economy law always makes instrument choice a critical determinant of
stringency. The EU, for example, favored stringent targets while opposing broad
liberal trading.232 Additionally, the United States in the past has supported bans on
some chemicals and stringent standards for other pollutants without fully exploring
costs and with little or no reliance upon trading. 233 This suggests that factors other than
cost effectiveness may influence government policy choices.234
Governments' sensitivity to estimates of future costs may vary with their leaders'
attitudes toward neoliberalism. The United States's opposition to Kyoto in spite of its
use of trading and statist Europe's support for targets without global trading suggest as
much. 235 Trading cannot save an agreement from a government determined to eschew
regulation altogether and it may not be necessary to persuade other governments to
sign up. The idea that sensitivity to cost may vary with ideology is also congruent with

231. Thomas Sterner & Henrik Hammar, Designing Instruments for Climate Policy, in
TRADING, supra note 55, at 17, 18.
232. See DESSLER & PARSON, supra note 1, at 15 (explaining that many European countries
wanted less flexibility to use foreign emissions reduction credits than the U.S., Russia, Japan,
and Canada wanted). Cf Michaelowa & Butzengeiger, supra note 87, at 2-3 (the EU opposed
trading in the run-up to Kyoto but embraced it afterwards).
233. See, e.g., Envtl. Def. Fund v. EPA, 489 F.2d 1247 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (upholding a ban on
DDT).
234. I am providing general thinking about the political economy of trading, not a
comprehensive empirical analysis of the particulars of Kyoto's political economy. Emissions
trading did prove essential to the Kyoto Protocol's entry into force, but not sufficient. It became
necessary to grant extra allowances to Russia to obtain ratification, thereby potentially coupling
trading with weaker limits. This suggests that once countries treat costs as critical, trading alone
may not be sufficient to get them on board, but rather laxity may be necessary. David M.
EMISSIONs

Driesen, ChoosingEnvironmentalInstruments in a TransnationalContext, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1,

47 (2000) (raising the possibility of relaxing stringency to buy assent to a regulatory regime).
235. See Michaelowa & Butzengeiger, supra note 87, at 1-2 (explaining that the EU
supported "stringent absolute emissions targets for industrialized countries" and opposed
international trading for a long time).
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empirical research on risk perception, showing a correlation between individual
236
attitudes toward risk and more general attitudes toward governments and markets.
Furthermore, trading's cost savings can only influence goal setting if policy makers
consider those cost savings before they materialize.237 If trading succeeds in
uncovering cost effective reductions not obvious to regulators, it follows that it further
weakens the officials' ability to predict future costs. Hence, setting goals that take
trading's cost savings into account may require a leap of faith that some may not be
prepared to make.238
The literature on political economy explains that polluters may favor grandfathered
trading programs over pollution taxes, because only taxes leave them with costs for
residual emission. 239 But a preference for trading does not inexorably make industry
supporters of strict targets. 240 Industry federations in many countries have
fought for
24 1
weak caps, greatly weakening the EU's trading scheme's first phase.

236. Dan M. Kahan, Paul Slovic, Donald Braman & John Ciastil, Fearof Democracy: A
CulturalEvaluation of Sunstein on Risk, 119 HARV. L. REv. 1071, 1072 (2005) (book review)
(finding that "cultural worldviews" influence risk perception). Professor Kahan and his
coauthors explain that "egalitarians" tend to favor environmental regulation and that
"individualists" tend to trust markets and react skeptically to environmental risks. Id. at 108384. Their empirical research confirms previous research finding that the egalitarians are more
concerned about global warming and other environmental hazards than the individualists. Id. at
1086; cf Cass Sunstein, Misfearing:A Reply, 119 HARV. L. REv. 1110, 1111 (2005) (agreeing
that cultural cognition influences risk perception, but arguing that it's "hardly undemocratic" to
ignore the misperceptions).
237. Driesen, supranote 234, at 49 (pointing out that the availability of lower costabatement
options in foreign countries will only affect the stringency of limits for a trading program if the
government considers those cost savings); cf Deiner, supra note 71, at 2117 (explaining that
states reducing greenhouse gas emissions report that doing so creates new jobs, develops new
technologies, and lowers energy costs).
238. See Terry Barker, Haoran Pan, Jonathan K61hler, Rachel Warren & Sarah Winne,
Avoiding DangerousClimate Changeby Inducing TechnologicalProgress;Scenarios Using a
Large-ScaleEconometricModel, in AVOIDING DANGEROUS CLIMATE CHANGEsupranote 134, at
362-64 (discussing the wide divergence of results in economic models assessing the costs of
climate change abatement); Kahan et al., supra note 236, at 1088 (explaining that cultural world
views influence perceptions of both the costs and benefits of dangerous activities). Professor
Kahan argues that differences among experts reflect their divergent world views. Id. at 10921094. He also argues that experts may "screen arguments and evidence" to protect their status
and beliefs. Id. at 1094. This suggests that economists may neglect leaming by doing in
economic modeling because recognizing the importance of something difficult to quantify
threatens their status, but others may create numbers because their world views favor doing
something about global warming.
239. See James M. Buchanan & Gordon Tullock, Polluters'Profits andPoliticalResponse:
DirectControl Versus Taxes, 65 AM. EcoN. REv. 139, 141-142 (explaining why polluters may
prefer regulations to taxes); Nathaniel 0. Keohane, Richard R. Revesz & Robert N. Stavins, The
ChoiceofRegulatory Instrumentsin EnvironmentalPolicy,22 HARv. ENVTL. L. REv. 313,34851 (1998) (explaining that polluters must pay taxes on residual emissions, but need not pay for
those emissions under trading).
240. See Michaelowa & Butzengeiger, supra note 87, at 5 (explaining how lobbying in the
EU led to goals in phase one that provided little departure from "business-as-usual" levels of
carbon emissions).
241. See Grubb et al., supranote 224, at 132-33 (describing industry lobbying's contribution
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It is unlikely that the political economic advantages of trading will make it feasible
to adopt a cap with an innovation premium sufficient to offset the innovation losses
from trading, at least for expensive innovation. The increased stringency deprives
polluters of the cost savings that trading would otherwise provide. Moreover, because
polluters will likely have little or no information about the marginal cost of reductions
at others' facilities that they might purchase, they may evaluate a proposed cap of X +
I in terms of the cost of making all of the reductions at their own facilities, attributing
little or no cost reduction to the market. Their own abatement costs (not taking into
account cost savings from trade) will be much higher for limit X+I than for limit X.
And vigorous industry opposition to a more stringent cap decreases the likelihood of
governments compensating for innovation lost through increased stringency. An
innovation premium is a good idea, but it may be difficult to obtain a reasonably
ambitious premium.
Market liberalism might ideologically undermine setting goals necessary to achieve
sustainable development, even though free market mechanisms lower costs that can
impede ambitious goal setting.242 Neoliberalism's political economy may prove more
complicated than many analysts have assumed.243
It would require a book to fully evaluate the myriad ways one might employ
instrument choice and design to address the tension between short-term costeffectiveness and long-term technological progress. Policymakers must confront this
tension both in choosing and designing instruments.
3. Institutional Relationships (of Government and Markets)
Broadly speaking, market liberalism advocates usually envision a broad role for
markets and sustainable development advocates tend to rely more heavily on collective
decision-making. The emissions trading case suggests that the question of the proper
role of governments and markets is much more complicated than generally assumed.
All serious efforts to address environmental protection involve a significant role for
markets and for government. Traditional regulation establishes markets by demanding
environmental improvements that require firms to hire people and/or purchase
equipment to reduce pollution. 24 4 And an economic incentive, in the form of a civil

to the EU's over allocation of phase one emissions allowances); Michaelowa & Butzengeiger,
supra note 87, at 3 (pointing out that German industry lobbied against the EU emissions trading
directive and that the chemical and aluminum industries lobbied, successfully, for their
exclusion from the scheme); FranceHaggles over Banking Rules as SecondNAP Set to Miss
Deadline, POINT CARBON (June 15, 2006), available at http://www.pointcarbon.com/
articlel 6056-868.html?articlelD= I6056&categorylD= (mentioning a French industry's
advocacy of a high phase two cap).
242. See, e.g., Choi, supra note 5, at 950 (attributing the U.S. failure to implement Kyoto to
"an economic way of thinking," which stresses "short-term costs rather than long-term
benefits").
243. See Driesen, supra note 234, at 47 (explaining that no economic reason exists for a
polluter to agree to emissions trading, unless government is willing to impose a more costly
alternative).
244. Driesen, supra note 52, at 293; see Samuel P. Hays, The Future of Environmental
Regulation, 15 J.L. &COM. 549,565-66 (1996) (characterizing traditional standards as the most
significant "market force" in environmental protection).
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penalty for violations of regulatory requirements, encourages them to do so. 245 On the
other hand, "free market mechanisms" require active government roles in establishing
goals and in enforcement. 24 6 Ignoring either the economic incentives that regulatory
programs create or government's role in designing and enforcing them can lead to
serious failures .247
The Kyoto emissions trading case raises questions about the notion that government
should excuse itself from oversight of technological choices made in pursuing
environmental goals. Sustainable development advocates believe that technological
choices made in pursuit of one environmental objective, such as carbon reduction,
implicate broader sustainable development concerns that merit consideration when
these choices are made. They tend to evaluate technological choices not only in terms
of their carbon reduction potential, but also in terms of their contribution to long-term
technological solutions and their collateral impacts on communities. 14 From the
perspective of market liberalism, government processes to consider public comments
and review projects that generate credits for their impacts on sustainable development
constitute "transaction costs" impeding markets, which governments should
minimize. 249 Serious regard for sustainable development, however, requires some
consideration of positive and negative externalities inherent in technological
choices. 250 This suggests that governments should not reflexively reduce transaction
costs (such as opportunities for public comment) without considering the corollary
benefits the transaction costs purchase, such as the opportunity to consider spillovers
benefiting future generations and intragenerational equity. 25 1 More fundamentally, the

245. See Driesen, supra note 52, at 336.
246. See Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 52, at 1352-59 (linking trading to a system that
provides for democratic goal setting); Robert W. Hahn & Gordon L. Hester, Where DidAll the
Markets Go? An Analysis ofEPA 's Emissions Trading Program,6 YALE J. ON REG. 109, 111
(1989) (monitoring and enforcement issues play a critical role in trading program design).
247. See, e.g., Ruth Greenspan Bell, Choosing EnvironmentalPolicy Instrumentsin the Real
World, in OECD GLOBAL FORUM ON SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: EMISSIONS TRADING 10
(2003) (arguing that emissions trading may not work well in countries lacking the capabilities to
define and implement complex systems); Driesen, supra note 10, at 22 (discussing the collapse
of a New Jersey emissions trading program because of efforts to delegate monitoring to aprivate
agency).
248. See, e.g., Haripriya Gundimeda, How Sustainable is the Sustainable Development
Objective of CDM in Developing Countries Like India, 6 FOREST POL'Y & EcoN. 329, 333
(2004) (explaining that project developers are likely to overlook micro level issues that
determine whether afforestation and conservation projects for credit harm or help the poor).
249. Robert N. Stavins, Implications of the US Experience with Market-Based
EnvironmentalStrategiesfor FutureClimate Change Policy,in EMISSIONS TRADING, supranote
55, at 66 (referring to government approval of individual trades as transaction costs); David M.
Driesen & Shubha Ghosh, The Functions of Transaction Costs: Rethinking TransactionCost
Minimization in a World of Friction, 47 ARIZONA L. REV. 61, 79-82 (2005) (reviewing
transaction cost minimization's role in emissions trading).
250. See James E. Krier, Risk andDesign, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 781, 782 (1990) (explaining
that externalities arise when A and B "mistransact" with respect to C, whose interest they do not
take into account).
251. See Michael S. Barr, Credit Where it Counts: The Community ReinvestmentAct and its
Critics, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 513, 602 (2005) (arguing that transaction costs generated by public
involvement in Community Reinvestment Act processes should be weighed against the benefits
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existence of these externalities raises questions about the neoliberal assumption that
single-minded cost effective pursuit of a single goal through emissions trading
constitutes an adequate vision of technological choice for sustainable development.
The positive spillovers and negative externalities stemming from technological
choices also raise questions about the internal consistency of market liberalism. Many
advocates of CBA's use in defining environmental goals defend it, in part, by pointing
out that government must evaluate "risk/risk" tradeoffs.

252

This tradeoff concept refers

to the danger that industry response to a mandate to reduce one form of pollution may
increase other more serious risks, a danger sustainability advocates have cited in
opposing CDM projects like the eucalyptus plantation mentioned previously. 253 New
York University Dean Richard Revesz has responded to the risk/risk critique by
pointing out that reducing a targeted risk often reduces another corollary risk.254 For
example, if our entrepreneur chooses a solar project to reduce carbon, her project will
also displace smog-producing pollution from a nearby coal-fired power plant that
severely threatens health in the near term. Of course, firms' technological choices
determine the existence and scope of ancillary risks and benefits. This implies that in
order to use CBA to evaluate collateral risks (and benefits), government must know in
advance what technologies firms will use to comply with government standards and
must consider the associated risks (and collateral benefits). Yet, the use of a global
market reduces the government's ability to predict technological choices, thereby
undermining CBA.255
Indeed, global trading fundamentally undermines even a sharply circumscribed
CBA focusing only on projections of direct costs and targeted benefits. For the cost of
reducing any environmental risk depends on the technological choices made in
addressing it. 256 If the government uses a trading mechanism, it undermines its ability

of "civic engagement"); Driesen & Ghosh, supra note 247, at 92-98 (discussing the tension
between the impetus to reduce transaction costs to encourage trading and the need to preserve
effective government oversight to protect environmental quality from poor quality trades);
accord Stavins, supra note 206, at 66 (the negative effects of transaction costs "should be
balanced against any anticipated benefits due to required government approval.").
252. See, e.g., AARON WILDAVSKY, SEARCHING FOR SAFETY 212 (1988); John D. Graham &
Jonathan Baert Wiener, Confronting Risk Tradeoffs, in RISK VERSUS RISK: TRADEOFFS IN
PROTECTING HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT 1 (John D. Graham & Jonathan Baert Wiener eds.,
1995); Randall Lutter & John F. Morrall IH,Health-HealthAnalysis: A New Way to Evaluate
Health and Safety Regulation, 8 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 43 (1994); Cass Sunstein, HealthHealth Tradeoffs, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 1533 (1996); W. Kip Viscusi, Risk-RiskAnalysis, 8 J. RISK
& UNCERTAINTY 5 (1994).
253. See Kysar, supra note 172, at 258-59 (defining "risk-risk analysis" as focusing
decision-makers on the secondary ancillary harms that come from regulating a chosen harm).
254. See Samuel J. Rascoff & Richard L. Revesz, The Biases of Risk TradeoffAnalysis:
Towards Parityin Environmentaland Health-and-SafetyRegulation,69 U. CHI. L. REv. 1763,

1766 (2002) (faulting risk tradeoff analysis's neglect of "ancillary benefits").
255. See David M. Driesen, Trading and Its Limits, 14 PENN ST. ENVTL. L. REv. 169, 173
(2006) (leaving the choice of technologies to regulated parties leaves the government with "no
timely means of evaluating risk/risk tradeoffs").
256. Driesen, supra note 234, at 49-50 (government must consider data of polluters'
abatement costs if it wishes to consider cost in setting a cap for a tradable permit program). Cf
Wiener, supra note 43, at 775 (suggesting that only "technology-based regulation" depends
upon agency consideration of abatement costs).
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to estimate these future costs2 57 because increasing spatial flexibility widens the
universe of possible technological options thereby complicating prediction of
technological choices. Of course, policy-makers can reduce this tension by not relying
on cost calculation in setting goals or by eschewing broad liberal trading. But broad
capacity to accurately estimate future costs and
liberal trading reduces government's
258
goals.
setting
in
benefits
Trading's capacity to undermine CBA suggests a tension between market
liberalism's institutional preference for markets and its analytical concepts. These
analytical concepts demand a comprehensive consideration of costs and benefits, while
actors, who may only consider their actions'
markets rely on the decisions of private
259
costs and benefits to themselves.
On the other hand, sustainable development advocates have not shown how their
preferred concept should concretely guide government regulation. Its vagaries may
serve well as a framework for democratic debate. 26 But the rubric does not function
precisely as a guide to macro-level decisions. 261 This imprecision may constitute a
virtue in some settings, but it leaves sustainable development open to charges of
irrationality.
The trading case reveals that sustainable development advocates face some other
challenges in seeking to apply collective decision-making to technological choices.
Richard Stewart has likened "command-and-control" regulation to discredited Soviet
style central planning.262 This charge clearly exaggerates the depth of technological
control regulators exercise through traditional regulation. As a rule, traditional
regulation only demands a specified improvement in environmental performance from
a particular industry.263 It does not fix production quotas, nor does it commonly 2dictate
64
fundamental technological choices, such as fuel choice for power production.
But sustainable development's call for collective decision-making and integrated
planning seems to require substantial community control over fundamental

257. See Kysar, supra note 172, at 268 (noting that analysts expected acid rain permits to
cost $1,500 a ton, but that they have traded for as little as $66.05 a ton).
258. See Driesen, supranote 255, at 173 (pointing out that CBA is more likely to be wrong
when a trading approach is used than when it is not used, because it is difficult to predict the
magnitude of the trading program's cost savings).
259. See EMISsIoNS TRADING, supra note 55, at 3 (stating that once government allocates
allowances its "action is limited to supervising the market, monitoring adequately, and applying
sanctions in the case of non-compliance").
260. See SEGGER & KHALFAN, supra note 45, at 4 (noting that sustainable development's
"inclusiveness" helped it guide diverse local, national, and international communities).
261. See id. (explaining that sustainable development does not function as a "scientific
blueprint" for decision-makers and that this has caused "difficulties" in recent years); cf Vhite,
supra note 20, at 27-39 (explaining sources of great indeterminacy in efficiency
determinations).
262. See Richard B. Stewart, Economics, Environment, and the Limits of Legal Control,9
HARv. ENVTL. L. REv. 1, 6 (1985).
263. See Richard B. Stewart, A New GenerationofEnvironmentalRegulation?,29 CAP. U.
L. REv. 21,94 (2001) ("command systems limit... the quantity of residuals that each actor may
generate").
264. See Swift, supra note 60, at 10336-37 (explaining that traditional regulations have
accommodated different base technologies for power generation, instead of encouraging shifts to
cleaner fuels and boiler designs).
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technological choices, much more control than either traditional regulation or
emissions trading usually offers. While both sustainable development and economic
rationality may require some role for collective decision-making in making
fundamental technological choices, it is not clear that government should make key
technological choices by itself.265 Public choice theory, another contribution of
neoliberal thinking, predicts that special interests will heavily influence government
267
decision-making. 266 Many sustainability advocates would agree with that analysis.
Sustainable development advocates seek to overcome special interest dominance
through public participation, greater transparency, and integrated planning. Some of
the insights of neoliberalism suggest that these efforts face challenges going beyond
the power of special interests. Even if the economists' call to discount future benefits
is at war with sustainable development, their recognition that people tend to discount
future benefits reflects a widespread reality. This suggests that sustainable
development's procedural allegiance to integrated planning may not lead to
achievement of sustainable development's substantive aspirations.
For many people participating in collective decision-making may prove reluctant to
incur costs in order to protect future generations' welfare. 268 The sustainable
development project, however, represents a belief that collective participation can
increase willingness to incur short-term costs in order to achieve long-term benefits.
The question of how to design institutions to make wise fundamental technological
changes presents a puzzle, a puzzle that lies sadly buried under much simplistic
rhetoric about "economic incentives" and "command-and-control" regulation. The
puzzle arises from market actors' systematic tendency to view such choices too
narrowly, coupled with the tendency of governments to avoid visible short-term costs
and offense to special interests. It's likely that the proper solution to this puzzle will
vary from country to country and will involve some mixture of government choices
and private initiative. In contexts like climate change, where we ultimately lead major
technological changes, the appropriate choices will recognize and address the tradeoff
between market liberalism's preference for cost effectiveness and the need for
investments that advance sustainable development to protect future generations.
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267. See, e.g., JIM VALLETTE & STEVE KRETZMANN, THE ENERGY TUG-OF-WAR: THE
WINNERS AND LOSERS OF WORLD BANK FOSSIL FUEL FINANCE 2 (2004) (chiding the World Bank
for funding projects benefiting "Northern fossil fuel corporations").
268. See Cass Sunstein, Irreversibleand Catastrophic,91 CORNELL L. REV. 841,864 (2006)
(stating that public resistance to paying now to reduce future risks fits standard claims about
discounting).
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CONCLUSION

The emissions trading experience under the Kyoto Protocol suggests that weak
market liberalism might manage to co-exist with weak sustainability. Either a strong
preference for markets (as opposed to economic concepts) or a strong concept of
sustainability, however, tends to sever the union. Liberal markets, even markets
designed for environmental protection, often fail to encourage expensive investments
leading to long-term benefits because of positive spillovers.
This implies that environmental law must address a tension between cost
effectiveness maximization and long-term technological capability. This tension
should influence both instrument choice and design.
The problem of the proper role of collective decision-making in technological
change poses a puzzle requiring much closer attention. Emissions trading's tendency
to undermine CBA suggests that neoliberalism's institutional direction conflicts with
its analytical predilections and with sustainable development. On the other hand,
collective decision-making does not provide a panacea either, as shortsightedness can
infect both public and private spheres. Study of the emissions trading experience under
the Kyoto Protocol yields fascinating insights about the relationship between
sustainable development and market liberalism. We can only hope that the nations of
the world will build on these insights as they move forward in addressing climate
change and other major global challenges.

